1 … it wrongly on some occasion? Mustn't I say he was mistaken?” Why should I say this & not rather, he has forgotten the meanings of his words. |
But after all only I can lastly decide whether what he said, is
right.
“We can't assume that he knows what I see
& I don't!”
We can absolutely do this! |
Can a man doubt whether what he sees is red or green?
[Elaborate this] |
“Surely if he sees || knows
anything he must know that he sees!” –
It is true that the game of “showing or telling what one
sees” is one of the most fundamental language games, which means
that what we in ordinary life call using language mostly
presupposes this game. |
I can for what I see 1 use the impersonal form of
description & the fact that I say “for what I see”
doesn't say at all that after all this is only a disguised
personal description!
For I just expressed myself in
English. || For I just expressed myself in our
ordinary form of expression. |
Ist ein Würfel ein äußerst regelmäßiger symmetrischer Körper, oder das
Unregelmäßige was ich sehe, wenn ich ihn von einer
Ecke aus sehe?
Was soll ich hervorheben?
Soll ich sagen er sei primär unregelmäßig aber man könne ihn als etwas
Regelmäßiges unregelmäßig projiziert darstellen, oder er sei primär
regelmäßig sei aber unregelmäßig projiziert gesehen?
|
What's the difference between me being angry and some
he being angry? |
If I wish to write down my experiences the two experiences that I am
angry & that he is angry are absolutely entirely different
(although the words used to describe them are very
similar.)
I might therefore naturally object to this way
of expression. |
“Ein Würfel hat 9 reelle Kanten & 3
imaginäre.” |
If I write down my own experiences nothing is more natural than to refer
by ‘I’ only to my body || or
L.W.'s body
as opposed to other bodies, but not to ¤ distinguish my
toothache from his by the words I & he. |
The usual game played with the word ‘toothache’
involves the distinction of bodies which have the
toothache. |
Does the solipsist also say that only he can play chess?
|
But he will say that behind the sentence ‘I see
… ’ when he says it & it's true there
stands something which does not stand behind “he sees” or
‘I see’ when the other man says it. |
I'll start with a description of what ‘I
see’ but in impersonal form. |
‘Ich spreche’ & ‘der Andere
spricht’ sind zwei
|
Ich sage “Es ist schön”, dann sage ich
“das habe ich gesprochen”.
Damit habe ich weder mir noch dem Andern gesagt wer es
gesprochen hat.
Ich habe einen gezeigt. weil es
nicht |
“Aber woher weiß ich daß ich gesprochen habe wenn
nicht aus der eigentümlichen motorischen Erfahrung des
Sprechens.” |
Das Wort ‘Ich’ bezeichnet keine Person.
|
Remember that, whatever the word ‘I’ means to you, to
the other man it shows || draws his attention to a
human body & is of no value otherwise. |
I could write say a book on Physics in
which every sentence starts with “I
remember”.
Could one say: Here the sentences are all directly backed by real experiences or by primary reality. We must make be misled in a queer way! |
“Surely”, I want to say, “if I'm
to be really quite frank I must say that I have something which
nobody has”. –
But who's I? –
Hell! I don't express myself properly but
there's something you can't deny that there is
my personal experience & that this in a most important sense
has no neighbour. –
But you don't mean by that that it happens to be alone
but that its grammatical position is that of having no
neighbour.
“But somehow our language doesn't bring it out, that there is something unique namely real present experience, & do you just wish to advise me to resign myself to that?” |
[A philosophical book might be entitled
|
(Funny that in ordinary life we never feel that we have to
resign ourselves to something by using ordinary
language!) |
How is it that the Auszeichnung we || I
might propose for those sentences which describe my own personal
experience does ¤ not really quite satisfy
me? |
Partly because of what we call “imagining that the other person
sees (feels pain etc.)”.
D.h. wir sind geneigt dasselbe Bild für ◇◇◇ Vorgänge zu verwenden. |
Now imagine this: as soon as he ⇄ even || even he has learnt enough of language to
1 be able to || say so || express
it he tells us that he saw blue when he said ‘Is not
red’. |
The person who paints his memories. |
Augustine, about expressing
the wishes inside him. |
Why shouldn't we consider the case that the child learns
to think & always dreams that it had a private language before it learnt
ours.
Only: What do we mean by learning the language? In what sense can we be said to teach the child the natural gesture-language? Or can't we teach him that? |
Kreis & Ellipse.
Soll ich sagen: “er hat der Kreis gestern als
Ellipse gesehen”, oder so stellt er den folgenden Tag
einen Kreis dar”. |
[Sich daran erinnern das & das gedacht zu haben.
“Ich erinnere mich nicht an ihn aber ich weiß || erinnere
mich daß er mir einen dümmlichen Eindruck gemacht hat.”] |
“He mostly sees red where we see red.” The normal use of the expression “he sees green where … ” is this: We take it as the criterion for that my ◇◇◇ meaning the same by ‘red’ as the other people || we do that as a rule I he argues with them || us in giving the same names to the colours of objects as they || we do. If then in a particular instant he says something is red when we should say that it's green we say that he sees it differently from us. Notice how in such a case we would behave. We should look for a cause of his differing judgement & if we had found one we should certainly be inclined to say he saw red when we saw green. It is further clear that even before ever finding such a cause we might under circumstances be inclined to say this. But also that we can't give a strict rule for … . |
Consider now this case:
Someone says I remember yesterday having seen everything red
green & vice versa.
Consider this case: someone says it's queer || I can't understand it I see everything red green || blue today & vice versa. We answer: it must look queer! He says it does & e.g. goes on to say how cold the glowing coal looks & how warm the clear (blue) sky. I think we should under these or similar circumstances be inclined to say that he saw red what we saw blue. And again we should say that we know that he means by the words blue & red what we do as he has always used them as we did || had. |
On the other hand: Someone tells us today that
yesterday he always saw everything red¤ blue and
so on.
We say it must have We say: But you called the
glowing coal red you know & the sky blue.
He answers: That was because I had also
|
Suppose Case of contradictory memory images.
Tomorrow he remembers this, the day after
tomorrow something else. |
The whole trend, to show that the expression “letting one look into
his soul” is often misleading. |
Back to the example of the afterimages or № 1.
We can say that these cases are not cases of
communications of personal
experiences if there were no
personal experiences
but only ‘the outward signs’? |
Now I ask what are our criteria for there being or there having been a
personal experience
besides the expression?
And here the answer seems to be that for
the outsider || the
other man the criteria are indeed more outside expressions, but
that I myself know whether I have an experience or not; in
particular |
But let me ask what is knowing that I see red like. I mean:
look at something red ‘know that it is red’ &
ask || observe || mark yourself what
you're doing.
Don't you mean seeing red & impressing it on your mind
that you are doing so?
But there are, I suppose, several things that you are doing:
You probably say to yourself the word
‘red’ or ‘this is red’ or
something of the sort, or perhaps glance from the red object to
another red one which you're taking to be the
paradigm of red & such like.
On the other hand you just intently stare at the red thing. |
In many || part of their uses the
words || expressions ‘visual
image’ & ‘picture’ run parallel but where
¤ they don't the analogy which does
exist tends to delude us. taut.
The grammar of ‘seeing red’ connected to the expression
of seeing red closer than one thinks. |
“You talk as though one
couldn't || can't see a red patch
without if one
doesn't || can't say
“Seeing something” of course doesn't mean the same as saying that one sees something but the senses of these expressions are closer related than it might appear to you. We say a blind man does not see anything. But not only do we say so but he too says that he does not see. I don't mean “he agrees with us that he does not see”, “he does not dispute it”, but rather, he too describes the facts in this way having learnt the same language as we have. Now whom do we call blind, what is our criterion for blindness? A certain kind of behaviour. And if a || the person behaves in that particular way we not only call him blind but teach him to call himself blind. And in this sense his behaviour also determines the meaning of blindness for him. But now you will say: “Surely blindness isn't just a behaviour; it's clear that a man can behave like a blind man & not be blind. Therefore ‘blindness’ means something different: in fact something this behaviour only helps him The idea is that we teach a man || person the meaning of expressions relating to personal experiences indirectly. – Such an indirect mode of teaching we could imagine as follows. № ) We || I teach a child the names of colours & a game, say, of bringing objects of a certain colour if when the ‘name of the colour’ is called out. I don't however teach him the colournames by pointing to a sample which we both see which both of us see which I & he see saying e.g. the word ‘red’. but Instead we let him look at a white wall sheet of paper through various || a pair of spectacles which if we look through them make us see the paper red & we say the word ‘red’ whenever we put these spectacles on his nose. I have various spectacles each of which when we || I look through it makes us || me see the white paper in a different colour. These spectacles are also distinguished by their |
[mind-reading] |
From this it should follow that we sometimes rightly sometimes
wrongly teach a man to say that he is blind: For what if
he saw all the time but nevertheless behaved exactly like a blind
man? –
Or should we say: “Nature wouldn't play
such a trick on us!”.
We can see here that we don't quite And what is so misleading to us about when we consider this use is the following: We say “Surely we can see something without ever saying or showing that we do & on the other hand we can say that we see so & so without seeing it, therefore seeing is one process & expressing that we see another, & all they have to do with each other is that they sometimes coincide; they have the same connection as being red & being sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet etc.” Now this is obviously not quite true & not quite false. It seems we somehow || that we look at the use of these words with some prejudice. It is clear that we in our language use the expression || words ‘seeing red’ in such 1 a way that we can say “he sees … || A sees red, but doesn't show it” on the other hand it is easy to see that we would have no use for these words if their application was severed from the criteria of behaviour, that is to say, to the language game which we play with these words it is, both, essential that the people who play it (should) behave in the particular way we call expressing || saying, showing what Balance: The point of the game depends upon what usually happens. Point of a game ¥ How does he know that he sees || has the visual image red i.e. how does he connect the word ‘red’ with ‘a particular colour’? In fact what does the expression ‘a particular’ here mean. What is the criterion for his connecting it || the word always to the same colour || experience? Is it not often just that he calls it red? |
⍈ But doesn't then
the word “seeing red” mean to me a particular
process || certain (private) experience or
(mental) event || fact in the realm of primary
experience , || – which surely is
utterly different from saying certain words?
|
In fact if he is to play a
language game the possibility of
this will depend upon his own & the other people's
reactions.
For The game depends upon the agreement of these reactions
i.e. they must
call || describe the same things
‘red’.
“But if he speaks to himself surely this is different. For then he needn't consult other people's reactions & he just gives the name ‘red’ now to the same colour as that || to which he called It is quite true, he connects the word & the experience. |
The words “‘seeing red’ means a part
experience” are useless || senseless unless we can follow them up by:
‘namely this → (pointing)’.
Or else they may say experience as opposed to
physical object, but
then this is grammar. |
(Still contradicting || objecting)But I
could use language just for making entries in my diary & without
even having learnt it I could have invented a name for
the particular || a
colour sensation say the name ‘red’ & then
used this name to write down whenever I had that
|
When you say “the expression ‘‒ ‒ ‒’ means to
you a certain private
experience” you are
(indeed) supplementing this statement by imagining
a red colour, or looking at a red object, or such
like (which supply the ‘namely this’),
but how do you make use || make use of the expression
& the experience you thus connect with it?
For how you say what we call the meaning of the word lies in the
game we play with it. |
But it seems to me that I either see red or don't see
red.
Whether I say || express it or not.
Picture we use here. This picture not questioned but its application. Other cases of tautologies. |
“Surely seeing is one thing, & showing that I see is
another thing”. –
This certainly, is like saying “skipping is one thing &
If I explain to someone to || the use of ‒ ‒ ‒ by ‒ ‒ ‒ Giving the ostensive definition simply consists in ‒ ‒ ‒. One might be inclined to say that castling was not just the act of … . But it is the game of which it is part … . So what does giving to myself the ostensive definition of red consist in? I suppose we should say I suppose looking || – Now how am I to describe it shall I say seeing red & |
But it's a blatant error to mix up ‘seeing
red’ with showing that you see red!
I know what seeing red is & I know what showing …
is.
Couldn't we say that knowing what showing …
is, is seeing In knowing what seeing red is you seem to give yourself a sample || you say to yourself ‘seeing red is this’ but you don't because the usual criteria for the sameness of the sample don't apply. I can say I call ‘red’ always the same colour or I whenever I explain red I point to a sample of the same colour. |
Isn't If we describe a game which he plays
with himself is it relevant that he should use the word red
for the same colour in our sense or would we also call it
a language game if he used it anyhow.
Then what is the criterion for using it in the same
way?
Not merely the connection between ‘same’,
‘colour’ & ‘red’?
|
Which is the same colour as that I saw?
Not the one to which I apply the words ‘this is the same
colour’? |
“Let me see if I still know which of these colours is
red? – (looking about) Yes I know.”
(Here I could have said “is called
red”.) |
So he can make sure of what it
means in this private way! || by having a private
sensation in this private way of what it
means!
Making sure that you know what ‘seeing
|
We can indeed imagine a Robinson
using a language for himself but then he must behave in a certain
way or we shouldn't say that he plays
language games with himself. |
The grammar of ‘private sense data’. |
Das Interessante ist nicht daß ich nicht auf mein Benehmen achten muß um
zu wissen, daß ich Zahnschmerzen habe,
sondern, daß mir mein Benehmen gar nichts sagt. |
“I sent him to the doctor because he moans” is
just as correct as “I sent him to the doctor
because he has toothache”. |
“I moan because I have pain”. –
Are you sure that that's why you moan? |
“But d. a. the nucleus of
our language remains untouched whatever we might imagine our behaviour to
be!”
The nucleus is the word & || together
with its meaning. |
“‘Toothache’ is a word which I use in a game
which I play with other people, but it has a private meaning to
me.” |
“Christen toothache.” |
Changing the meaning of a word.
Meaning connected with the use of the
ostensive
definition. |
In the use of the word meaning it is essential
|
Consider a game in which this isn't so.
Would you call this sort of activity a game? |
“Are you sure that you call ‘toothache’
always the same private experience?” |
‘I recognize it as being the same’.
And are you also recognizing the meaning of the word the
same, so you can be sure that “recognizing it to be the
same” now means the same to you which it did before?
|
“But in ostensively defining a word for myself I impress
its meaning on me so as not to forget it later
on”.
But how do you know that this helps.
How do you know later on whether you remember it
rightly or wrongly. |
Can you recognize something to be red which isn't red?
|
To be sure that so & so is the case.
To know: Does ‘p’ follow from
‘I know p’?
Does it make sense to say, that what you see is green, & you recognize it to be red? |
“It seems to me to have sense”.
You are undoubtedly using a picture therefore it ‘seems to you to make || have sense’. But ask yourself what use you are making of that picture? We shall have to talk about sense & nonsense later. |
What's the use here of being sure of it if it
doesn't follow that it is so & if your being sure is the
only criterion there is to || for it being
so? That means: This isn't at all a case of being sure, of conviction. |
The word ‘recognizing as … ’ is used where
you can be wrong in recognizing. |
– Sometimes these bodies change their weight & then we look
for the cause (of it) || of the change & find, say, that something's come off the
body.
or that 1 the body has in some way |
Sometimes however the weight of a body changes & we
can't account for it || the change at
all.
But we still nevertheless don't say that weighing it had
lost its point “because now the body really doesn't have
any one weight”.
Rather we say that the body had changed somehow that this was the cause of
the change of weight but that hitherto we are
not || have not found this cause.
That is, we shall || will go on playing the game of weighing
& || we try to find an
explanation for the exceptional behaviour.
We talk of || use the formal expression “the weight of a || this body” to designate something inherent in the body something which could only be demolished by destroying part of the body. The same body – the same weight. (And this is a grammatical proposition) Green. Supposing what in fact is the rule became the exception. Under certain peculiar circumstances indeed a body weighed kept on weighing the same. Say iron in the presence of mercury. ¤ A piece of cheese on the other hand though keeping its size, calories, etc., weighed Would we still … On the one hand it seems that if there wasn't the behaviour of toothache … “So & so has excellent teeth, he never had to go to the dentist, never complained about toothache; but as toothache is a private experience we can't know whether he hasn't had terrible toothache all his life”. ¥ What is an assumption that e.g. ‘A has toothache’? Is it the saying the words “A has toothache”? Or doesn't it consist in doing something with these words? ⍈ How does one assume such & such to be the case? |
A game of assumption: ‒ ‒ ‒ |
Assuming: a state of mind. Assuming: a
gesture. |
“But the point is just that we don't assume
that we have toothache.
Therefore even if we have no ground for assuming that
anyone else has toothache we may nevertheless
know that we have.”
But would we in this case at all talk of a
|
Showing his grief, || – hiding his grief. |
Certain behaviour under certain
circumstances we call showing our
toothache other behaviour, hiding our
toothache.
Now would we talk about this behaviour in this way if people
didn't ordinarily behave in the way they do?
Suppose I & they described my behaviour without such a
word as pain, would the description be incomplete?
Supposing The question is: do I consider it
incomplete?
If so I will distinguish between two cases of my
behaviour & the others will say that I use two words alternately for
my behaviour & thereby they will acknowledge that I have
toothache. |
“But can't he have toothache
without in any way showing it?
And this shows that the word
‘toothache’ has a meaning
entirely independent of a behaviour show connected with
toothache.” |
We can't “The game which we
play with the word ‘toothache’
entirely depends upon there being a behaviour which we call the expression
of toothache. |
“We use ‘toothache’ as
the name of a personal experience”. –
Well let's see how we use the
word! |
“But you know the sensation of
toothache!
So you can give it a name, say,
‘toothache’.”
|
But what is it like to give a sensation a name?
Say it is pronouncing the name while one has the sensation &
possibly concentrating on the sensation, – but what of it?
Does this name thereby get magic powers?
And why on earth do I call these sounds the ‘name’ of
the sensation?
I know what I do with the name of a man or of a
number but what have I by
this act of ‘definition’ given the name a
use? |
“I know what toothache
is”.
But how do I know that I know it?
Because something comes before my mind?
But || And how do I know that that is the right
|
“But when you ask me “do you know what
toothache is” I answer yes after having
brought before my mind a certain sensation.”
But now is this certain sensation
characterised?
Only by that that it comes when you say the word
‘toothache’?
Or that it comes & you are in some way satisfied? |
“To give a sensation a name” means nothing unless I know
already in what sort of a game this name is going to be used.
|
I've described certain behaviour by: ‘it is
obvious that he was hiding his pain’ or: ‘I think he
was hiding his pain’ or ‘I don't know at all
whether he was hiding pain’. |
But can't I just assume with some degree of certainty
that he has I can say “I assume … ”, but if I sent them all to the doctor although they showed no sign of illness || pain, I should just be called mad. |
That we try to account for something is due to the fact that we
often can account for it.
If I saw no regularity whatever I should not be inclined to
assume || say that there is one which I
haven't as yet discovered.
What usually happens makes me take this point of view. |
The ‘private definition’ is not
binding. |
In our private
language game we had, it seemed, given a name to
an impression, – in order, of course, to use
it || the name for this
impression in the future.
The def.,
that is, should have determined on future
occasions for what impressions to use the
word ‘red’ || name & for
which not to use it.
Now we said that on certain occasions
we were inclined
after having given the def.
we did use the word and on
other
we
didn't not; but we described these |
“But surely I feel justified when normally I use the word
‘red’ although I don't think
of a def. while doing so.”
Do you mean that whenever normally you use the word
‘red’ you have a particular feeling which you call a
feeling of justification.
I wonder if that is true.
But true or not || anyhow by
‘justification’ I
didn't mean a feeling.
But I think I know what makes you say that on saying
e.g. this chair || book is red you have a
feeling of being justified in using the word.
For you might ask: isn't there an obvious
difference |
“But do you mean that one man couldn't play a game of
chess with himself & [Private
experiences in fiction.]
same in the different cases?
Mustn't we say in this case that we can't say anything
whatever about private experiences & are in fact not
even entitled to use the words experiences at all?
What makes us believe that we are is, that we really think of the
case in which we can describe his private
experiences describing different
kind || ways of playing chess in
one's imagination. |
How can we say he may see red although nobody may be able to find it
out? |
If we go through with this idea of the || a private
experience which we don't know we can't talk of a
certain private experience either, because
In which it alludes to a certain class of experiences which we know though we don't know which one of its members he has. Rather the private experiences || impressions which we imagine as the background to the foreground of our actions dissolve¤ into a mist which we wished to refer to talk about & imagined to be back of our action ¤ || Rather the private experiences which we imagined as an unknown x a, y, z etc. behind our actions, lo¤se their individualities & dissolve into a mist & into nothing. |
One might suggest–: The word
‘toothache’ stands on the one hand for a
behaviour & on the other hand for a private experience.
The connection is that when a man has the
private experience he
tends to behave in the particular way. But why should you talk of a private experience & not 100 private experiences, as you don't know whether there is any red or whether there are 100? |
What is so confusing here is to talk of the meaning of the word instead of
the use.
The idea of different kinds of objects. |
Why should you know better what experiencing is like with the other person
than what seeing red is like?
If you were very careful you would say “a ’ certain something”. |
What does it consist in || is happening || is it that
happens when in one case I say “I have
toothache || see red & mean it, isn't &
I am not lying, & I know what I'm saying,
& on the other hand I say the words but know that they are not true,
or say them not knowing what exactly they mean
etc.? |
The criteria for it being the truth have to be laid down beforehand
in common language || are laid down in language
(rules, charts etc.).
“But how am I to know how in the particular case to apply
them?” –
For if || as far as they are laid down || For, being
laid down … || For in so far as
they
They join the rest of the rules of common language. Is there such a thing as justifying what in the particular case I do just by what then further is the case and not by rule? Can I say: I am now justified in using the sentence just by what is now the case … ? No! Nor can I say || does it help me to say I am justified “when I feel justified”. For about feeling justified the same things can be said as about feeling toothache. |
My criteria for having toothache are the same as || saying I have toothache is no other than for the
others saying I have toothache, for I
can't say that feeling, or having,
toothache is my criterion for having a right to say
it. |
Examine: ‘These two operations bring about the same
pain’.
The pain which they all bring about I shall call
toothache.
What does this shew?? Now I might explain. Did I give the name ‘toothache’ to a behaviour? Did I call a behaviour “having toothache”? Did I call a behaviour “having the same pain”? But showing toothache can never be saying … Ich glaube ich wollte zeigen, daß ‘toothache’ hier nicht als Name eines Benehmens gebraucht ist gegeben wird & daß man auch nicht auf eine Erfahrung hinten dem Benehmen zeigt. I must assume an expression which is not lying. Now do I say that there is |
When I say that moaning is the expression of
toothache then under certain
circumstances the idea possibility of it
being the expression without the feeling behind it mustn't enter
my game. |
Es ist Unsinn zu sagen: der Ausdruck kann immer lügen. |
The language games with expressions of feelings are
(private experiences) are based on games with expressions of
which we don't say that they may lie. |
“But was I when a baby taught that
toothache meant my expression of toothache?” –
I was told that a certain behaviour was called expression of
toothache. |
“But isn't it possible that a child should behave just
as a normal child when it has toothache &
not have toothache?” |
But does if we speak of the baby, ‘having
toothache’ mean the same as
‘behaving such & such’? |
We say “poor thing, it moans”. |
“Can't I in the child too, separate the moaning from
the pain.
Can't I say that I pity it because it has pain not because it
moans? |
You ought I suppose to say that you pity it because you believe that it
has pains.
But what is believing that it has pains like, as opposed to
believing || just seeing that it moans?
It doesn't here consist in believing that he doesn't
cheat but in a different
experience. |
“Something clicked in my brain || mind when
I came to this colour”.
(This is a gesture.) But did you know from the clicking
that it was red.
Supposing looking at this colour your eyes opened wider & you gave
a jerk, – was it by its producing this reaction that
you recognized
|
“But surely there is a case in which I'm justified to
say “I see red”, where I'm not lying, &
one where I'm not justified in saying
this || so!”
Of course I can be justified by the ostensive def. or by
asking the others “now isn't this red?”
& they answer that it is.
But you didn't mean this justification, but one
that || which justifies me privately whatever others
will say. |
“But do you mean to say that the truth or falsehood
of my saying ‘I see red’ does not consist in there being
red before my mind's eye in one case & not in the
other; but that it depends on such things as whether
I say it in this or that tone of voice || with a
certain tension or without?”
|
If I say “I see red” without reason, how can I
distinguish between saying it with truth & saying it as a
lie? |
It is important here that there
is no such case as || that I exclude the case of saying the untruth by
mistake. |
Hier haben wir keinen Vergleich des Satzes mit der Wirklichkeit!
(Kollationen) |
Don't I know, when I say “I see red” &
I am lying, that I am lying? –
When do I translate my experience into the words expressing my
knowledge?
One might say: knowing that I am lying doesn't mean saying
that I do but being ready to say it. |
I could say: Lying is characterised by a
peculiar || an experience of
tension.
What is it like to know that I don't see red & to say
that I do? |
“Well it is simply not seeing red & saying
“I see red”!”
There is nothing
|
“What I now call … ” |
[We never dispute the opinions of common sense but we
question the expression of common sense.] |
Suppose I said “I see red” & was lying for I
actually saw red – but had made a slip of the tongue.
But which lie was it I had said, or (rather) thought? Of course I may say later “I wanted to say “I see green”” but did anything correspond to these words while I said “I see red”? |
But suppose that he felt that he was lying but never said so, –
was did he know that he was lying or not? |
“Did he know that he was doing, what we call
lying?”
“Did he know that he was doing what on other occasions he called
lying?” |
What is his criterion for saying
|
Do these two sentences || Are these two sentences to say the same thing: “He says he sees red &
really sees red” & he says he sees
red with conviction || and has the experience of not
lying? |
“So you think seeing red consists in saying ‘I see
red’ in a certain tone of voice?” –
No, but “ saying “I see red” &
seeing it might be saying it in a certain particular tone of
voice. |
How do I imagine myself seeing red?
Don't I imagine red?//
Isn't it by imagining red?!//
But how do I imagine myself addressing a meeting? |
Imagine a Robinson lying to
himself. –
Why is this difficult to imagine?
Look at something red & say to yourself “I see green” a) meaning by ‘green’ what usually you mean by ‘red’ (i.e. speaking the truth) b) lying. |
But one might call it lying to oneself if one
e.g. turns one's watch forward to
make oneself get up
earlier. |
Falsifying an account.
I add up numbers arrive at 2730 then rub out 3 & put a 5
instead. |
When in this discussion we talk of lying it ought always to mean lying
to oneself subjectively lying &
subjectively lying to the other person & not to
oneself. |
If I see green without saying where “I see
green”, in what way can these words be said to describe what
I see? |
One could imagine someone constantly lying subjectively but not
objectively. |
Imagine this case: Someone has a particular way; if lying,
he …
He always , lies, calling red ‘green’ & green ‘red’, but as a matter of fact what he says agrees with the usage of the other people & so his lying is never noticed. taken notice of. |
Supposing one said: To see red means to see that
which makes me inclined to describe it by saying
‘ … ’.
“To know that I am lying means to have that || an experience which I should describe by the words ‘ … ’.” |
[Our language on the one hand has very much more possibilities of
expression than logicians admit || dream
of || imagine & on the other hand the uses of
its || these modes of expressions are very much
more limited than logicians || they imagine.] |
What makes lying “I see red” into
lying?
The subjective || private experience of not
seeing red or the private experience of feeling a certain
tension? |
Is it wrong to say that lying in such & such cases consists in
saying so & so & feeling a
tension?
Man könnte sehr wohl sagen daß manchmal die Lüge dadurch charakterisiert ist daß ich mir bewußt bin daß es sich anderes |
Wenn ich nun sage “der lügt, der sagt ‘ich sehe
rot’ & sieht grün”, so stimmt das nicht, denn ich
mußte sagen “der lügt der sagt ‘ich sehe rot’
& weißt (oder glaubt) er sieht
grün”. |
“Der lügt, der sagt “ich sehe rot” &
sieht die Farbe, die er selbst mit dem Worte grün bezeichnen
würde.”
Aber das heißt doch (wohl) wahrheitsgemäß
so bezeichnen würde.
Oder können wir sagen, “für sich so bezeichnen
würde”?
Daher ja die Idee daß man lügen kann indem man laut das eine & leise das andre sagt & was man laut sagt ist hier die Lüge. |
“Der weiß, welche Farbe er sieht, der es irgendwie
ausdrücken könnte.”
Was ist das Kriterium dafür daß, er
das || es könnte? |
Was soll es dann heißen: einen Farbeneindruck wahrheitsgemäß
mit ‘rot’ bezeichnen?
Paßt das Wort dem einen Eindruck besser als dem anderen? |
Man könnte hier auch sagen man solle gar nicht von
subjektiver Wahrheit der Farben sprechen.
Die Wahrheit des Satzes “Ich habe Zahnschmerzen” habe
nur objektiv beurteilt zu werden. |
“Das wahre Wort kommt anders als das falsche.” |
Man kann sagen: “Alle diese Worte sind in derselben
Weise gekommen.” |
Das Wort welches Du sprichst ist eine
Reaktion.
Die Reaktion die wir in dem
Satz übersehen “er sieht … ”. –
Aber ist es nicht wahr daß der Andere nicht wissen braucht, daß meine
Reaktion in dieser & dieser Weise vor sich geht?
Er meint, ich sage ihm geradeheraus was ich sehe & es
ist nicht so, sondern ich erfinde eine Lüge. |
“Er weiß nicht was ich sehe, bis ich es ihm sage; ich weiß es
schon vorher ehe er es
erfährt.”
Könnte es auch umgekehrt sein? |
Ich habe jetzt lange mit einem Bleistift geschrieben: wußte ich
in diesem Satz daß die Schrift grau & das Papier weiß
ist?
Wußte ich das, || ? oder wußte ich bloß, daß es ist wie es ist? |
“Ich weiß, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus gesagt
habe.” –
“Ja, aber war nicht vor dieser
‘Reaktion’ schon etwas da, nämlich eben das
Erlebnis, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe?”
|
“Können wir nicht doch sagen, daß etwas jedem sichtbar ,
(äußerlich), geschah || geschieht & etwas
weiteres nur mir wahrnehmbar || erkennbar, ‘in
mir’?” |
“How am I justified in saying to myself that I
see this apple as red”?
You are not justified. –
But isn't it true that when I say the truth I am justified
& when I'm lying I'm not
justified. |
How is a lie possible in a case where there is no
justification? |
Supposing one said, lying (here) consists in applying one word to
the colour
|
I am justified if the word comes in
one way, & not justified if it comes
in an other way.
–But in which way? –
If it comes in the straightforward way I'm justified.
But which is the straightforward way? –
I know but can't explain as the paradigm of it is in
me. –
But as far as it's in you it serves no purpose in the future
application of the word.
(private
ostensive
def.) |
How do I know that it comes in the straightforward way?
What the straightforward way is must be fixed
by a paradigm. |
“Why on earth should it be wrong to use a word not in the simple
(‘straightforward’) way?”
Couldn't it not even be my duty to use the word which
doesn't come straightforwardly?
Imagine the case where we had laid down a code in which
‘red’ meant green. |
“I said the word with a bad conscience.”
|
What troubles me are the propositions in which
an action is described accompanied by a ‘state of
mind’. |
“Lying when you say “I see red” consists
in saying these words & having a private experience which I call
‘feeling unjustified’, or
‘seeing green’ etc.” –
“But suppose that I call the feeling of being justified
“feeling
unjustified”!?” –
This || Now this last sentence though it sounds absurd
had sense. |
“What you say comes to this: that when
you || I truly say that
‘I see red’ you are || I am not
justified in saying this by the || a fact
that you || I see red”. –
No I should say ‒ ‒ ‒ |
“You either have a feeling of being unjustified or you
don't!” |
“But surely there is a case in which I say ‘I see
red’ & am telling the (subjective) truth &
one in which I tell a
lie!” –
Yes, that is, we distinguish between telling the || a case of
telling the truth & not telling || a case of not
telling the truth. –
But what does lying in this || such a case, consist
in?
We may try all sorts of explanations:
“It consists in saying … & seeing
green”, “It consists in saying … &
knowing that I see … ”, “It consists in saying
… & feeling that I'm not justified in saying
this” & others.
Now let me ask: do all these
explanations come to the same or do they
describe different facts?
We might || may || can say: if they
describe different cases || facts the differences are
quite unimportant to us
(here) || don't matter to us here.
For our purpose they can all be said to describe the same
fact || case.
(We might have said lying consists in saying “I see
red” & having stomach ache but
as stomach ache is a private
sensation why not rather consider the
private sensation of
just seeing green a colour other than red?)
We may say therefore that these explanations for our purpose were no
explanations at all.
They left us just
|
When we talk of the private experience which the
others don't know we originally ⇄ don't || don't originally
mean to talk of a shapeless nothing but of a variable with certain
definite values. |
It is said sometimes that if I & someone else are looking at some
object I can never know what colour the other really sees.
But with what
… . But the word ‘to have’ could here only help us if it had no meaning at all & then it couldn't help us. But as long as ‘to have’ here has any meaning at all it can't help us & when it has no meaning at all I think it can't help us either. |
“We distinguish between … & … ”
that means: We some times sometimes use the expression
“I lied when I said that I saw green”
sometimes || as opposed to “I told the
truth when I said ‘ … ’”.
But isn't this enough? –
“But under what circumstances do you use the expression
‘ … ’”?
But must I necessarily stop giving you circumstances with
when I have given you a sample?
Why not when I have given you a word, a verbal expression?
Is the use of such an expression necessarily indefinite as compared
|
The word lying is taught us in a particular way in
which it was fastened to a certain behaviour to the use
of a certain expression under certain circumstances.
Then we use it saying that we have been lying when we our have
noticed it behaviour was not the one like the one which first
constituted the meaning. Just in the same way we were taught the word ‘red’ in a game say like number one & then we use it when the conditions are different (compare the past in the description of a dream) (and of course it isn't just the word ‘red’ we use but the whole imagery connected with it). |
“But you talk as though there was only the word
‘red’ || expression
‘I see red’ but not an impression corresponding to
it.”
On the contrary I too distinguish between don't say that
when a man says … he also has the impression. |
But is all that happens that you say ‘I see
red’?
Isn't there something else being the case, happening, when you
say this & it is true?
But if you ask isn't there something else happening, you
don't mean just anything else e.g. that
it's raining.
So after all you'll have to give descriptions of what
it is that happens || you mean is happening & insofar
as you give a description of it you must know what it is that
happens & it is not a || the
x.
And keeping it partly unknown doesn't help you either.
On the other hand there is no reason why you should
always stop with giving a sample & not with giving
a word || an expression. (In this sense one can say
that an expression acts as a picture) || as much as a picture
as a sample). |
The philosophical puzzle seems insoluble if we are
frank to || with ourselves,
& is, insoluble.
That is 1 That is until
that is we change our question. |
‘Expression can always be
lying.’ How can we say this of the expression to which
|
“But I always know whether I'm lying or
not!” – You are
first || now obsessed with the
word || the use of the word
‘lying’.
As a rule || In general you talk without thinking
of lying & of whether you lie or
not. |
But (then) I'm always either lying or not lying!
(Whether I always know it or not.) |
[Is there always a link between reality & our
expressions?] |
Suppose a child learnt the word ‘toothache’ as an
equivalent for its moaning & noticed that
whenever it said the word or moaned the grown-ups treated it
particularly well.
The child then uses moaning or the word
‘toothache’ as a means to bring
about the desired effect: is the child lying?
|
You say: A grown-up “Surely I can
moan with toothache & I can moan without toothache, so why
shouldn't the child be able it be so with the
child?
Of course I only see
Now one can moan because one has pains or, or e.g., one can moan on the stage. How do I know that the child, small as it is, doesn't already act & in this case I teach it to mean by ‘toothache’ something I don't want || intend it to mean? |
I have taught the child to use the expression ‘I have
toothache’
But now I also teach the child to moan on the stage! That is to say I even teach him || it to use this expression in a different game. I also teach it to read out the sentence ‘I have toothache’ out || from a book, when it hasn't toothache. In fact I could teach it to lie, as a separate language game. (In fact we often play this kind of game with children.) |
“But doesn't what you say come to this that it
doesn't matter what the persons feel as long as only they behave a
particular way?” |
“But “Do you mean that you can define pain
in terms of behaviour?”
But is this what we do if we teach the child to use the expression ‘I have toothache’? Did I say || define: “Toothache is such & such a behaviour”? This would obviously be entirely against || This obviously contradicts the normal use of the word! “But can't you, on the other hand, |
“But aren't you neglecting something – the
experience or whatever you might call it –?
Almost the world behind the mere words?”
|
But here solipsism teaches || can teach us a
lesson; It is the thought which is || It is
that thought which is on the way to destroy this
wrong idea. || error.
For if the world is idea it isn't any
person's idea.
(Solipsism stops short of saying this & says that it is my
idea).
But then how could
‘I neglect that which goes without saying.’ |
“What is seen , I see” (pointing to
my body), I point at my
visual || geometrical eye, saying this.
Or I point with closed eyes & touch my breast
& feel it.
In no case do I make a connection between what is seen & a
person. |
Back to ‘neglecting’!
It seems that I neglect life.
But not life physiologically understood but life as consciousness.
And consciousness not physiologically understood; but or, understood
from the outside, but consciousness as the very essence of experience,
& the appearance of the world, the world.
|
Couldn't I say: if I had to add the world to my language
it would have to be one sign for the whole of language which sign could
therefore be left out. |
How am I to describe the way the child learns the word
‘toothache’ – like this?
The child sometimes has toothache it moans
& holds its cheek, the
grown-ups say “ … ”
etc..
Or: The child sometimes moans & holds its cheek,
– the grown-ups “ … ”?
Does the first description say something superfluous or false or
does the second leave out something essential?
Both descriptions are correct. |
“But it seems as if you were neglecting
something.”
But what more can I do than distinguish the cases of saying
‘I have toothache’ when I
really have toothache, & the case
of saying the words without having the
toothache?
I am also || further ready to talk of any x behind my words so long as it keeps its identity. ¥ |
‒ ‒ ‒But why shouldn't I say “I have
toothache in his tooth”.
I would insist on his tooth being extracted.
Who
|
What does it mean distributing primary experience over all
subjects?
Imagine that they have all real toothaches in their
teeth.
The one which now only I have.
I now describe certain facts.
(Not metaphysical ones but facts about the
connection || coincidence of certain experiences.)
|
He gets a blow & cries, – I think: “no
wonder for it really hurts”.
But wouldn't I say to myself: Queer that
he cries for I feel the pain all right, – but
he?! |
What does it consist in that I have pain, I feel
myself crying, I hear that I am crying, my
mouth cries? |
It seems there is a phenomenon which in general I refer to as ‘my
toothache’ which, experience teaches me, is always
connected with one particular person (not ‘I’ but)
L.W..
I now imagine facts other than they are & connect up this
phenomenon to all sorts of persons so as to make it not at all tempting to
call this phenomenon ‘my toothache’. Isn't it a particular phenomenon to hear myself speak (not, ‘to hear L.W. speak’). ‒ ‒ ‒ |
“I see so & so” does not mean
“The person so & so e.g.
L.W. sees so
& so”. |
A language game in which everybody
calls out what he sees but without saying “I see
… ”.
Could anybody say that what I call out
is incomplete because I have left out to mention the
person?! |
A language game in which everybody (& I too) call out what
I see without mentioning me. |
They always know what I see.
If they don't seem to, I misunderstand what they say.
|
I am tempted to say: “It seems at least
a fact of experience that at the source of the visual field there
is mostly a small man with gray flannel trousers in
fact L.W.”. –
Someone might answer me to this: It is
true
|
“Ich bin doch bevorzugt.
Ich bin der Mittelpunkt der Welt.”
Denken wir uns ich sähe mich in einem Spiegel das sagen & auf mich
zeigen!
Wäre es noch richtig?
When I say that I play a unique role I really mean the geometrical eye. |
On the other hand if I describe the usual appearance of my body around the
geometrical eye this is on the same level as saying that I see in the
middle of the visual field there is in general a brown table & at
the edges a white wall (as I generally sit in my room).
Now suppose I described this in the form: The visual world in general is like this: (follows the description). Would this be wrong? – Why should it be wrong?! But the question is, what game is to be played || I intend to be playing with this sentence, e.g., who is allowed to say it & what are the reactions to this statement || what the reactions to this statement are to be, and how || in what way are the people who hear it || those to whom it is said to react to |
Can't I say something to nobody, neither to anybody else
nor to myself?
What is the criterion of saying it to myself? |
If I see a fire he runs to extinguish it. |
At intervals I paint what I see.
But can't someone else paint it for me?
Or the picture be presented to me somehow, already
finished? |
What, if I see before me a picture of the room as I am seeing the
room?
Is this a language game? |
I want to say: “the visual world is like this
… ”,– but why say anything? |
Der Solipsismus || Die Auffassung des
Solipsismus erstreckt sich nicht auf Spiele.
Der Andere kann so gut Schachspielen, wie ich || kann
Schachspielen so gut wie ich. I.e., when we play a language game we are on the same level. |
“I am in the lucky position of being in the source of the
visual world || field.”
It is I who see it.”
I have a comfortable feeling while saying this although the
statement isn't one of the class of statement which in general
give me this kind of feeling.
I said it as though I had said I am the wealthiest
person man in the place || have more money than anyone
else. |
⍈
But the point is that I don't establish a relation between a
person & what is seen.
All I do is that alternately I point in front of me & to
myself. |
But sure what I now see, this room || this view of my
room, plays a unique role, it is the visual world! (Der Solipsist flattert & flattert in der Fliegenglocke, schlägt sich an den Wänden, flattert weiter. || stößt sich an den Wänden, flattert weiter. Wie ist er zur Ruhe zu |
You use “‒ ‒ ‒ || Description: this
is what I now see”.
Leave out the “see”, leave out the
“now”, leave out the “this”
& leave out the “I”. |
“(Description)”: this is the visual
world”.
But why do you say visual & why do you say that it's the
world? |
“A red patch is (now) at the
center”.
All others must say “I see … ”.
But is this distinction necessary, as I know anyhow who's saying
it, I whether I or one of the others? |
But the real question for me is here: How am I
defined?
Who is it, that is favoured?
I.
But may I lift up my head to indicate who it is?
– Supposing I constantly change & my surrounding does: is there still some continuity namely by it being me & my surrounding that were changing?! || change?! |
(Isn't this similar to thinking that when things in
space || spatial things have changed entirely there's
still one thing that
|
But is my hand favoured as compared to someone else's
hand I see?
This is ridiculous.
Then either nobody is favoured or I am, that is the person
L.W. whose hand
is lifted. |
All right, – when I, L.W., see what's seen! |
Where is my toothache?
I.e. how is its place determined?
|
“What I now see justifies me in
saying that I see red”.
And what do you now see?
If the answer is “this” it is no answer I give to
myself. || The answer may be “this” but you
◇◇◇ answer I don't tell myself what it is I
see.
I don't see what I see more definitely if at the same time I see my finger pointing to it. (The question ought to have been what are you now looking at). I don't tell myself what it is I see by looking at || seeing my finger pointing to what something. Suppose I said: “What I now see justifies me in saying “I see red” because it is the same colour as this sample”, |
Is the criterion for my playing a private game of chess my being however
strongly inclined to say that I am playing one?
|
How does one feel whether I am strongly inclined?
|
What would I say if I in my
private judgements came into contradiction with
all other people.
I.e. if I could no longer play a
language game with them.
Or if all the facts around me became
extraordinary?
Would I stick to my judgements? |
Suppose someone asked me “What does it mean to play a
private game of chess with oneself” & I answered:
“Anything, because if I said that I was playing
a game of chess I would be so
Under what circumstances would we say that he did what we call portraying & under what circumstances that he called something portraying which we didn't call that? Suppose here we said: Well I can never know what he does inwardly would this be anything than resignation? |
Suppose someone painted pictures of the landscape which surrounds it, he
sometimes paints the leaves of trees orange sometimes blue, sometimes the
clear sky red etc.
Under what circumstances would we agree with him that he was
portraying the landscape? |
But can't he play a game with the colournames against whatever
anybody else says?
But why should we call it a game with the colournames.
“But if I played it I would stick to saying that I was
playing a game with the colournames.”
But is that all I can say about it; is all that I can say for its being
this kind of game that I stick to calling it so? |
Under what circumstances would || do I say I am
entitled to say that I'm seeing red.
The answer is showing a sample i.e. giving the
rule.
But if now I came into obvious || constant
contradiction with what anybody else said, should I not say that I am
applying the rule in a way which prevents me from playing their
game.
That is: is all that is necessary that the rule
I give should be the rule they give or isn't besides this an
agreement in the application necessary? |
If the “he has the || having the
same pains” means the same as
“he says || saying
that he || one has the same pains”
then “I have the same pain” means the same as “I
say that I have the same pains” & the exclamation
‘oh!’ means “I say
‘oh!’”. |
Roughly speaking: The
word || expression
of || ’I have
toothache‘ stands for a moan but
it does not mean ‘I moan’. |
But if “I have toothache”
stands for a
One might say: it too stands for a moan, that of compassion. |
“Toothache, seeing etc.
I only know from myself & not from the other.”
“I never know that he has toothache, I only know when I have it.” “I can only believe that he has it, that he has what I have.” “Has ‘toothache’ then a different meaning in my case & in his?” “Isn't it possible that everybody should have toothache but without expressing it?” “If it is possible that sometimes one can have ‘toothache’ without expressing it, it is possible that always this should be so.” “If my personal experience is all I know how can I even assume that there is any other besides?” “Does ‘toothache’ in the other mean behaviour?” “I only know what I mean by ‘toothache’.” “I was taught the word ‘toothache’ in connection with my behaviour but interpreted it to mean my pain.” “Only my ‘toothache’ is real toothache”. “What justifies me in saying that the other has toothache is his behaviour, what justifies me saying that I have is the experience of toothache.” “Is there only the expression of toothache & not the toothache?” “I know what it means to say that the other has ‘toothache’ even if I have no means to find out whether he has.” |
“Only he knows whether he has toothache,
we can never know.”
“Does the I enter into the personal experience or not?” |
We aren't lying || are speaking the truth
if a fact corresponds to the sentence.
This is no explanation at all but a mere repetition unless we
can supplement it by ‘namely this↗’ & a
demonstration & the whole explanation lies just in this
demonstration.
The whole problem here only arose through the fact
that in this case the demonstration is of a different
kind, that the demonstration of ‘I see
red’, ‘I have toothache’
seems indirect. to be a demonstrate in a different
sense than the term of
If I say we must assume an expression which can't lie this
can't be explained by saying, that really pain || pain really corresponds to this
expression. |
“But aren't you saying, that
I am saying that there is nothing behind the moaning. |
“Do you deny that the moaning is the expression of
something”.
No, that is I too should call moaning an expression (or even an
expression of something though this is misleading).
But the word expression here only characterizes the
language game played with it.
I react differently.
|
“So, you don't really have pain, you just
moan?!” –
There seems to be a description of my behaviour & also, in the
same sense a description of my experience of my pain!
The one so to speak the description of an external the other of an
internal fact.
This corresponds to the idea that it in the sense in which I can give
a part of my body a name
I can give a name to a private experience (only
indirectly).
And I am drawing your attention to this that the language games are |
You couldn't call moaning a description!
But this shows you how far the
proposition “I have
toothache” is from a
‘description’, & how far teaching the use of the
word toothache is from teaching the word
tooth.
|
One could from the beginning teach the child the expression “I
think he has toothache” instead of “he has
toothache” with the
corresponding doubtful || uncertain tone of
voice.
This mode of expression could be
described by saying that we can only believe that the owner has
toothache.
But why not in the child's own case? Because there the tone of voice is simply determined by nature. |
In “I have toothache” the
expression of pain is brought to the same form as a description “I
have a matchbox || I have 5
shillings”.
|
We teach the child to say “I have been lying” when it
has behaved in a certain way.
Imagine here a typical case of a lie.
Also this expression goes along with a
But doesn't the child know that it is lying before ever I teach him the word || verbal expression? Is this meant to be a metaphysical question or a question about facts? It doesn't know it as words. And why should it know it at all? – “But do you assume that it has only the facial expression of shame, e.g., without the feeling of shame? Mustn't you describe the inside situation as well as the outside one?” – But what if I said that by facial expression of shame I meant what you mean by the facial expression & the feeling, unless I explicitly distinguish between genuine, & faked || simulated facial expressions? It is, I think, misleading to describe the genuine expression as a sum of the expression & something else, though it is just as misleading to say that the genuine expression is nothing but || besides a particular behaviour. || is a particular behaviour & nothing besides. We just mistake || misunderstand / get the function of our words || expressions of language if we || by : |
We teach the child the use of the word “to
speak”.
= Later it uses the expression “I speak || spoke
to myself”. =
We then say “We never know whether &
what a person speaks to himself”. |
The Surely the description of
the facial expression can be meant
(used) || is used as a description of feelings & can
be meant || used otherwise.
In a story we often We constantly use such
expressions as “When he heard that he
made || pulled a long face” & don't
add that the expression was genuine.
In other cases we describe the acting of a person in the same words or
again we wish to leave it open whether the expression was genuine or
not.
To say that a description of feelings of expressions used as a
description of feelings is indirect || we describe the feeling indirectly
by the description of expressions is
wrong! |
Imagine a language in which toothache is
called “moaning” & the difference between just
moaning & moaning with pain is expressed by the moaning or
dry tone in which the word is pronounced.
People would not say in this language that it became clear later on that |
Supposed Suppose he says to himself
“I lie”, how do we know whether he means
it? || what is to show that he means it?
But we should || would any
day || time describe this lying by saying:
“He said … & told himself at the same time that
he was lying”.
Is this too an indirect description of lying? |
But couldn't one say that if I speak of a
man's angry voice meaning that he was angry & again of his
angry voice not meaning that he was angry in the first case the meaning of
the description of his voice was much further reaching than in the
second case?
I will admit that our description in the first case
doesn't omit anything & is as complete as
though we had said that he really was angry, – but somehow the meaning
of the expression then goes beyond || reaches
below the surface. |
But how does it do that?
The answer to this would be an explanation of the use || two
uses of the expression.
But how could this explanation reach
“Then is there nothing under the surface?!” But I said that I was going to distinguish two expressions, one for the ‘surface’ & one for ‘what is below the surface’ only remember that these expressions themselves correspond just to a picture, not to its usage. It is just as misleading to say that there is nothing but || just surface & nothing underneath it as that there is something below the surface & not that there isn't just the surface. Because once the picture we use || make use of the picture of the ‘surface’ it is most natural to use it such as to express the distinction as that between something on & something below the surface. || express with it the distinction as on & below the surface. But Because we naturally use the || this picture to express the distinction as that between ‘on the surface’ & ‘below the surface’ But we misapply the picture if we ask whether both cases are or aren't on the surface. |
Now in order that with its normal meaning we should teach a child the
expression “I have lied” the child must behave
in the normal way.
E.g. it must under certain
circumstances ‘admit’ that it
lied, it must do so with a certain facial expression etc.
etc. etc..
We may not always find out whether he lied or not but if we never found
out the word would have a different meaning.
“But once he has learnt the word he can't be in doubt
whether he is lying or not!” –
Consider the case of the person who finds that his subjective lies
are judged by the ordinary criteria,
truths.
He says that he has been to school feeling that
it's a lie but the teacher & the boys
confirm that he has been etc.
etc..
You might say: “But surely he can't
be in doubt that he said a subjective
lie”.
But suppose he said “I've been to
school” This of course is like saying that he can't be in doubt about whether he has toothache or whether he sees red etc. On the one hand: doubting whether I have the experience E is not like doubting whether someone else has it. Remember what we said about the asymmetry of the game № 1. On the other hand Doubting e.g. whether to say “I see red” or “I see green”. “But this is a simple doubt about the appellation of a colour & it can be settled by asking someone what this colour (pointing) is called”. But are all such doubts doubts about what people removable by this question (or which comes to the same by giving a definition “I shall call this colour so & so”)? |
“What colour do you see?” –
“I don't know – is it red, or
isn't it red; I don't know what colour it is I
see.” –
“What on earth do you mean What do you
mean?
Is the colour constantly changing, or do you see it so very faintly,
practically black?”
Now Could I say then: “don't
you see what you see?”
I This obviously would make no sense. |
Colour: black || red &
white || blue chequered. |
“What colour do you call: a, e, i, o or
u?” –
“I don't know which colour I
see?” |
“Primary colours are those used in flags.”
It is queer that one never uses brown on a flag & says it is a blend of yellow, black & red although nobody can really produce a proper brown by mixing these colours. |
Is there a reason for not admitting brown as a primary
colour?
Is it not enough that we refuse to group it with red, blue, green, etc.? |
One sometimes thinks the reason is that we see transitions from brown to
pure yellow, red, black; but so we do in the case of red
etc. |
Imagine all objects around us where iridescent, I mean of the appearance
of a white surface || paper on which the sun is
shining, you would see the surface covered with tiny specks of red
blue green yellow. |
Shall we say that a pointillist sees the objects as he paints
them? |
It seems as though, however the outward
circumstances change, once the
To say that I can't doubt whether I see red is in a sense absurd as the game I play with the expression “I see red” doesn't contain a doubt of this form. It seems, – whatever the circumstances I always know now whether to apply the word or not. It seems, at first it was a move in a special game, but then it becomes independent of this game. (This reminds one of the way the idea of length seems to become emancipated from any particular method of measuring it.) |
We are tempted to say: “damn it all, a rod has a
particular length however I express it.
And one could go on to say that if I see a rod I always see
(know) how long it is although I can't say
how many feet, meters etc. – But suppose I just
say: I always know whether its
◇◇◇ || it looks tiny or big! |
But can't the old game lose its
point when the circumstances change, so
that the word || expression ceases to have a
meaning although of course I can still pronounce it. |
He sticks to saying that he has been lying although
none of the normal consequences follow.
What is there left of the language game,
except that he says the expression? |
We learn the word ‘red’ under
particular
circumstances
Certain objects are usually red & keep their colour, most people
agree with us in our colour judgements.
Suppose all this changes: I see blood unaccountably sometimes one
sometimes another colour & the people around me all make different
statements.
But couldn't I in all this chaos retain
the || my meaning of ‘red’,
‘blue’, etc. I although I
couldn't make myself understood to anyone?
Samples e.g. would all constantly change their colour – ‘or ◇◇◇ changing the meaning does it only seem so to me?’ “Now am I mad or have I really called this ‘red’ yesterday?” |
The situation in which we are inclined to say “I must have gone
mad!” |
“But we could always call a colour-impression
‘red’ & stick to it this
application!” |
Die Atmosphäre man die dieses Problem umgibt ist
schrecklich.
Dichte Nebel der Sprache sind um den problematischen Punkt
gelagert.
Es ist beinahe unmöglich dazu zu kennen zu ihm
vorzudringen. |
Suppose I said had before me drawings of what I & other
people now see & I said of the drawing of what I see “there
is something unique about this picture”. |
If I can speak about ‘what is seen’, why
shouldn't anyone else speak about it? –
But I have a feeling that only I can; if I assume that others also speak
about what normally I should call my visual image there seems to me to be
something
If ‘what I see’ has nothing to do with a particular person why should I feel that there's something wrong in assuming that anybody might talk about it i.e. mean it when he speaks? Then of course I can't tell them what I see nor they me what they see any more than I can tell myself what I see. But they could make conjectures as to what might happen in future in our visual field. In the normal game I say: “I don't know what they see, they've got to say what they see”, – but in the game I'm considering they would as much know what I see as my hand can write down what my mouth can say. And their different conjecture would be like conjectures made by myself at different times. Can my mouth tell my hand what I see in order that my hand should be able to write it down? |
Do I by painting what I see tell myself what I see?
|
“This picture is unique, for it represents what is
really seen”.
What justification do I have to say this? || What is my justification for saying this? |
I see two spots on this wall & lift two
fingers.
Do I tell myself that I see two spots?
But on the other hand couldn't this be the sign that for
my seeing two spots?! |
Ist das Bild ausgezeichnet oder zeichne ich es aus?
|
“Today he points to me, & yesterday he pointed
to me also.” |
The meaning of: “He points at
me”. |
“I see that he points at A.”
“I see that he points at me.” |
You seem to be able to give yourself a sort of ostensive
explanation
|
Imagine a game: a group of people tell each other A
tells B what B sees B tells A what A sees
One person tells the other what he (the other) sees if he has
guessed it rightly he is rewarded.
If A hasn't guessed correctly what B sees B
corrects him & says what it is he sees.
This game could be like is more instructive if we imagine the
persons not to say what is seen but to paint it or to make models of
it. –
Now let me imagine that I am one of them.
the players.
Wouldn't I be tempted to say: “The game is asymmetrical, for only what I say I see corresponds to a visual image.” |
The problem lies thus: This
↗) is what is seen;
& this is also what I see. |
Frage Dich: Kann das ↗) nur ich
sehen, ober kann es auch ein Andrer sehen?
|
Für mich existiert kein Unterschied zwischen ich &
das↗; & das
Wort “ich” ist für mich kein Signal, das einen Ort
oder eine Person hervorhebt || bezeichnet || eines Orts oder einer
Person. |
Ich versuche das ganz Problem auf das
◇◇◇ || nicht verstehen ◇◇◇
der Funktion des Wortes ‘Ich’ &
‘↗’ zu
reduzieren. |
When I stare || am at a coloured object
& say “this is red” I seem to know exactly to what
I give the name red.
As it were to that which I am drinking in. |
It is as though there was a magic power in the words
“this is … ”. |
I can bring myself to say: There is no toothache there
↗ (in the
man's cheek who says he has toothache).
And what would be the expression for this in ordinary language?
Wouldn't it be my saying “I have no
toothache there”? |
“But who says this?” –
“I!”
And who says
|
Suppose I give this rule: “Whenever I said
‘I have toothache’, I shall from
now on say ‘there is
toothache’”. |
I tell the waiter bring me always clear soup & thick soup to
the others.
He tries to remember my face.
Suppose I change my face (body) every day entirely, how is he to know which is me. But it's a question of the existence of the game. “If all chessmen were alike how should one know which is the king?” Now it seems that, although he couldn't know which is me, I still could || would know it. Suppose now I said: “it wasn't so & so, it was I who asked for clear soup”, – couldn't I be wrong? Certainly. I.e. I may think that I asked him, but didn't. Now are there two mistakes I can make: one, thinking that I asked him, the other, thinking that I asked him? I say: “I remember having asked you yesterday”, he replies: “You weren't there at all yesterday”. Now I could say either |
It seems that I can trace my identity quite independent of the
identity of my body.
And the idea is suggested that I trace the identity of something
dwelling in a body the identity of my mind. |
“If anybody asks me to describe what I see, I describe
what's seen.” |
What we call a description of my sense datum, of what's seen,
independent of what is the case in the physical world, is
still a description for the other person. |
If I speak of a description of my sense datum I don't
mean to give a particular person as its
possessor.
(No more do I want to speak about a particular person when I moan with pain.) |
It must be a serious & deep-seated
disease of language (one might also say ‘of
thought’) which makes me say: “Of course
this ↗) is
what's really seen”. |
I can tell you the fact p because I know that p is the
case.
But It has sense to say “it rained & I knew
it” but not “I had toothache & knew that I
had.”
“I know that I have toothache” means nothing
or the same as “I have toothache”.
This, however, is a remark about the use of the word “I”, whoever uses it. |
Compare with this such a statement as: “surely || of course I know what I am referring
to by the word toothache”. |
Think of the state || frame of mind || mental state
in
which you say to yourself that p ∙ ~p
must || does make sense & by repeating a statement of
this form you are, as it were, by introspection trying
to find out what it means. |
The state || phenomenon of staring is closely bound
up with the whole puzzle of solipsism. |
“If I am asked ‘what do you see?’, I
describe the visual world.” –
Couldn't I say instead of this “ … I am describing
what's || what is
there↗”
(pointing before me)? |
But now consider the case of someone having a picture before him of the
part of his room he is seeing & that he's
saying: “this in the picture is like this (a
part of his visual field, as he is looking at his
room).” |
1) Continuation from Ms-148,48v.
2) See facsimile; line connecting this remark with the following one.
To cite this element you can use the following URL:
BOXVIEW: http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/BTE/Ms-149_n