| 1 it wrongly on some occasion? Mustn't I say he was mistaken?” Why should I say this & not rather, he has forgotten the meanings of his words. |
|
But after all only I can lastly decide whether what he said, is
right.
“We can't assume that he knows what I see
& I don't!”
We can abs. do this! |
|
Can a man doubt whether what he sees is red or green?
[Elaborate this] |
|
“Shurely if he
|
|
I can for what I see 1 use the impersonal form of
description & the fact that I say “for what I see”
doesn't say at all that after all this is only a disguised
personal description!
For I just expressed my self myself in
|
|
Ist ein Würfel ein äußerst regelmäßiger symmetrischer Körper, oder das
Unregelmäßige was ich sehe, wenn ich ihn von einer
Kant Ecke aus sehe?
Was soll ich hervorheben?
Soll ich sagen er sei primär unregelmäßig aber man könne ihn als etwas
Regelmäßiges unregelmäßig projiziert darstellen, oder er sei primär
regelmäßig sei aber unregelmäßig projiziert gesehen?
|
|
What's the difference between me being angry and some
he being angry? |
|
If I wish to write down my experiences the two experiences that I am
angry & that he is angry are absolutely entirely different
(although the words used to describe them are very
similar.
I might therefore naturally objec[k|t]t to this way
of expression. |
|
“Ein Würfel hat 9 reelle Kanten & 3
imaginäre.” |
|
If I write down my own experiences nothing is more natural than to refer
[to|by] ‘I’ only to my
|
|
The usual game ˇplayed with the word ‘toothache’
involves the distinction of bodies which have the
toothache. |
|
Does the solipsist ˇalso say that only he can play chess?
|
|
But he will say that behind the sentence ‘I see
… ’ when he says it & it's true there
stands something which does not stand behind “he sees” or
‘I see’ when the other man sais it |
|
I'll start with a description of what ‘I
see’ but in impersonal form |
|
‘Ich spreche’ & ‘der Andere
spricht’ sind zwei
|
|
Ich sage “Es ist schön”, dann sage ich
“das habe ich gesprochen”.
Damit habe ich weder mir noch dem Andern gesagt wer es
gesprochen hat.
Ich habe einen gezeigt[,|.] weil es
nicht |
|
“Aber woher weiß ich daß ich gesprochen habe wenn
nicht aus der eigentümlichen motorischen Erfahrung des
Selbst [s|S]prechens. |
|
Das Wort ‘Ich’ bezeichnet keine Person.
|
|
Remember that, whatever the word ‘I’ means to you, to
the other man it
|
|
|
I could write say a tex book on Physics in
which every sentence starts with “I
remember”.
Could one say: Here the sentences are all directly backed by ˇreal experiences or by primary reality. We must make be mislead in a queer way! |
|
“Surely”, I want to say, “if I'm
ˇto be really quite frank I must say that I have something which
nobody has”. –
But who's I? –
Hell! I don't express myself properly but
there's something you can't deny that there is
my personal experience & that this in a most important sense
has no neighbour. –
But you don't mean by that that it happens to be alone
but that it's grammatical position is that of having no
neighbour.
“But somehow our language doesn't B bring it out, that there is something unique namely real present experience, & do you just wish to advise me to resign myself to that?” |
|
[A philosophical book might be entitled
|
|
(Funny that in ordinary life we never feel that we have to
resign ourselves to something by using ordinary
language!) |
|
How is it that the Auszeichnung
|
|
Partly because of what we call “imagining that the other person
sees (feels pain etc.)”
D.h. wir sind geneigt dasselbe Bild für ◇◇◇ Vorgänge zu verwenden. |
|
Now imagine this: as soon as he ⇄ even has learnt enought ˇof language to
1
|
|
⍈This sounds as if then we
really ought to be convinced that he saw blue
etc. |
|
The person who paints his memories. |
|
|
Augustin, about expressing
what the wishes inside him. |
|
Why shouldn't we consider ˇthe case that the child learns
to think & always dreams that it had a private language before it learnt
ours.
Only: What do we mean by learning the language? In what sense can we be said to teach the child the natural gesture-language? Or can't we teach him that? |
|
Can't the child learn to wish for an apple by learning to
draw an apple?2
|
|
|
Kreis & Elipse.
Soll ich sagen: “er hat der Kreis gestern als
Elipse gesehen”, oder so stellt er den folgenden Tag
einen Kreis dar”. |
|
[Sich daran erinnern das & das gedacht zu haben.
“Ich erinnere mich nicht an ihn aber ich
|
|
“He mostly sees red where we see red” The normal use of the expression “he sees green where … ” ist this: We take it as the criterium for that my ◇◇◇ meaning the same by ‘red’ as
Notice how in such a case we would behave. We should look for a cause of his differing judgement & if we had found one we should certainly be inclined to say he saw red when we saw green. It is further [k|c]lear that even before ever finding such a cause we might under circumstances be inclined to say this. But also that we can't give a strict rule for … . |
|
N Consider now this case:
Someone says I remember ˇyesterday having seen everything red
green & vice versa.
Consider this case: someone sais
|
|
On the other hand: Someone tels us today that
yesterday he always saw everything red, blue and
s.o..
We say it must have We say: But you called the
glowing coal red you know & the sky blue.
He answers: That was because I had also
|
|
Suppose Case of contradictory memory images.
tomorrow he remembers this, the day after
tomorrow something else. |
|
The whole trend, to show that the expression “letting one look into
his soul” is ˇoften misleading. |
|
Back to the example of the afterimages or № 1.
We can say that these cases are not cases of
ˇcommunic. of personal
exp. if there were no
pers. exp.
but only ‘the outward signs’? |
|
Now I ask what are our criteria for there being or there having been a
pers. exp.
besides the expression?
And here the answer seems to be that for
the outsider // the
other man // the criteria are indeed more outside expressions, but
that I myself know whether I have an experience or not in
par- |
|
But let me ask what is knowing that I see red like. I mean:
look at something red ‘know that it is red’ &
|
|
In
taut.
The grammar of ‘seeing red’ connected to the expression
of seeing red closer than one thinks. |
|
“You talk as though one
“Seeing something” of course doesn't mean the same as saying that one sees something but the senses of these expressions are closer related than it might appear to you. We say a blind man does not see anything. But not only do we say so but he too sais that he does not see. I don't mean “he agrees with us that he does not see”, “he does not dispute it”, but rather, he too describes the facts in this way having learnt the same language as we have. Now whome do we call blind, what is our criterium for blindness? A certain kind of behaviour. And if
The idea is that we teach a
|
|
[mid reading] |
|
From this it should follow that we sometimes rightly sometimes
wrongly teach a man to say that he is blind: For what if
he saw all the time but nevertheless behaved ˇexactly like a blind
man? –
Or should we say: “Nature wouldn't play
such a trick on us!”.
We can see here that we don't quite
And what is so misleading to us about when we consider this use is the following: We say “Surely we can see something without ever saying or showing that we do & on the other hand we can say that we see so & so without seeing it, therefore seeing is one process & expressing that we see an other, & all they have to do with each other is that they sometimes coincide; they have the same connection as being red & being sweet. Sometimes what is red is sweet, etc.” Now this is obviously not quite true & not quite false. It seems we somehow that we look at the use of these words with some prejudice. It is clear that we in our language use the
Balance: The point of the game depends upon what usually happens. Point of a game ¥ How does he know that he
|
| ⍈ But doesn't then
the word “seeing red” mean to me a
|
|
In fact if he spi is to play a
lang. games the possibility of
this will depend upon his own & the other people's
reactions.
For The game depends upon the agreement of these reactions
i.e. they must
“But s if he speaks to himself surely this is different. For then he needn't consult other people's reactions &
It is quite true, he connects the word & the exp.. |
|
The words “‘seeing red’ means a part
experience” are [useless| senseless] unless we can follow them up by:
‘namely this → (pointing)’.
Or else they may say experience as opposed to
phys. obj., but
then this is grammar. |
|
(Still
|
|
When you say “the expression ‘‒ ‒ ‒’ means to
you a certain private
exp.” you are
(indeed) supplementing this ˇstatement by imagining
a red colour, ˇor looking at a red object, or such
like (which supply the ‘namely this’)
but how do you make
|
|
But it seems too me that I either see red or don't see
red.
Whether I
Picture we use here This picture not questioned but its application. Other cases of tautologies. |
|
“Surely seeing is one thing, & showing that I see is
another thing”. –
This certainly, is like saying “skipping is one thing &
If I explain to someone to the use of ‒ ‒ ‒ by ‒ ‒ ‒ [T|G]iving the o. d. simply consists in ‒ ‒ ‒. One might be inclined to say that castling was not just the act of … . But it is the game ˇof wh which it is part … . Thus ˇSo what does giving to myself the ostensive def. of red consist in?
|
|
But it's a blatant error to mix up ‘seeing
red’ with showing that you see red!
I know what seeing red is & I know what showing …
is.
Coudn't we say that knowing what showing …
is, is seeing In knowing what seeing ˇred is
|
|
Isn't If we describe a game which he plays
with himself is it relevant that he should use the word red
to the same colour in our sense or would we also call it
a lang. game if he used it anyhow.
Then what is the criterium for using it in the same
way?
Not ˇmerely the connection between ‘same’,
‘colour’ & ‘red’?
|
|
Which is the same colour as that I saw?
Not the one to which I apply the words ‘ˇthis is the same
colour’? |
|
“Let me see if I still know which of these colours is
red? – (looking about) Yes I know.”
(Here I could have said “is called
red”) |
| ⌊⌊So he can make sure • he
did of what it means ↺in this private way
• by having a priv.
sens.’!⌋⌋
Making sure that you know what ‘seeing
|
|
We can indeed imagine a Robinson
using a language for himself but then he must behave in a certain
way or we shouldn't say that he plays
lang. games with himself. |
|
The grammar of ‘ˇprivate sense data’ |
|
Das Interessante ist nicht daß ich nicht auf mein Benehmen achten muß um
zu wissen, daß ich Zahnschm. habe,
sondern, daß mir mein Benehmen gar nichts sagt. |
|
“I sent him to the doctor because he moans” is
just as correct as “I sent him to the d
because he has toothache”. |
|
“I moan because I have pain”. –
Are you sure that that's why you moan? |
|
“But d. a. the nucleus of
our language remains untouched whatever we might imagine our behaviour to
be!”
The nucleus is the word & ˇtogether
with its meaning. |
|
“‘Toothache’ is a word which I use in a game
which I play with other people, but it has a private meaning to
me.” |
|
“Christen toothache” |
|
Changing the meaning of a word.
Meaning connected with the use of the
ostens.
def.. |
|
In the use of the word meaning it is essen-
|
|
Consider a game in which this isn't so.
Would you call this sort of activity a game? |
|
“Are you sure that you call ‘toothache’
always the same private experience?” |
|
‘I recognize it as being the same’.
And are you also recognizing the meaning of the word the
same, so you can be sure that “recognizing it to be the
same” now means the same to you which it did before?
|
|
“But ˇin ostensively defining a word for myself I impress
its meaning on me so as not to forget it later
on”.
But how do you know that this helps.
How do you know ˇlater on whether you remember it
rightly or wrongly |
|
Can you recognize something to be red which isn't red?
|
|
To be sure that so & so is the case
To know: Does ‘p’ follow from
‘I know p’?
Does it make sense to say, that what you see is green, & you recognize it to be red? |
|
“It seems to me to have sense”
You are undoubtedly using a picture therefore it ‘seems to you to
|
|
What's the use here of being sure of it if it
doesn't follow that it is so & if your being sure is the
only criterion there is
That means: This isn't at all a case of being sure, of conviction. |
|
The word ‘recognizing ˇas … ’ is used where
you can be wrong in recognizing. |
|
– Sometimes these bodies change their weight & then we look
for the cause (of it) ˇof the change & findˇ, say, that something's come off the
body[,|.]
or that 1 the body has in some way |
|
Sometimes however the weight ˇof a body changes & we
can't account for
Supposing however what way the
Green. Supposing what in fact is the rule became the exception. Under certain peculiar circc. indeed a body weighd kept on weighing the same. Say iron in the presence of mercury. Most ◇◇◇ a piece of cheese on the other hand though keeping its size, calories etc., weighed Would we still on the one hand it seems that if there wasn't the behaviour of t. “So & so has excellent teeth, he never had to go to the dentist, never complained about toothache; but as toothache is a private experience we can't know whether he hasn't had terrible toothache all his life”. ¥ What is an assumption that e.g. ‘A has toothache’? Is it the saying the words “A has t.”? Or doesn't it consist in doing something with these words? ⍈ How does one assume such & such to be the case? |
|
A game of assumption: ‒ ‒ ‒ |
|
Assuming: a state of mind. Assuming: a
gesture. |
|
“But the point is just that we don't assume
that we have t..
Therefore even if we have no ground to assuming that
anyone else has t. we may nevertheless
know that we have.”
But would we in this case at all talk of a
|
|
Showing his grief, – hiding his grief. |
|
Certain behaviour ˇunder cert.
circumst. we call showing our
t. other behaviourˇ, hiding our
t..
Now would we talk about this behaviour in this way if people
didn't ordinarily behave in the way they do?
Suppose I ˇ& they described my behaviour without such a
word as pain, would the description be incomplete?
Supposing The question is: do I consider it
incomplete?
If so I will pe distinguish between two cases of my
behaviour & the others will say that I use two words alternately for
my behaviour & thereby they will acnowledge that I have
t.. |
|
“But can't he have t.
without in any way showing it?
And this shows that the word
‘t.’ has a meaning
entirely independent of a behaviour show connected with
t..” |
|
We can't pl “The game which we
play with the word ‘t.’
entirely depends upon there being a behaviour which we call the expression
of t.. |
|
“We use ‘t.’ as
the name of a personal experience”. –
Well lets see how we use the
word! |
|
“But you know the sensation of
t.!
So you can give it a name, say,
‘t.’.”
|
|
But what is it like to give a sensation a name?
Say it is pronouncing the name while one has the sensation &
possibly concentrating on the sensation, – but what of it?
Does this name thereby get magic powers?
And why on earth do I call these sounds the ‘name’ of
the sensation?
I know what I do with the name of a man or of a
[N|n]umber but what have I b[a|y]
th[ese|is] act of ‘definition’ given the name a
use? |
|
“I know what t.
is”.
But how do I know that I know it?
Because something comes before my mind?
|
|
“But when you ask me “do you know what
t. is” I answer yes after having
brought before my mind a certain sensation.”
But now is this certain sens.
characterised?
Only by that that it comes when you say the word
‘t.’?
Or that it comes & you are in some way satisfied? |
|
“To give a sensation a name” means nothing unless I know
already in what sort of a game this name is going to be used.
|
|
I've described certain behaviour by: ‘it is
obvious that he was hiding his pain’ or: ‘I think he
was hiding his pain’ or ‘I don't know at all
whether he was hiding pain’. |
|
But can't I just assume with some degree of certainty
that he has I [k|c]an say “I assume … ”, but if I sent them all to the doctor although they showd no sign of
|
|
That we try to account for something is due to the fact that we
often can account for it.
If I saw no regularity whatever I should not be inclined to
|
|
The ‘private definition’ is not
binding. |
|
The role of In our priv.
lang. game we had, it seemed, given a name to
an impression, – in order, of course, to use
|
|
“But surely I feel justified when normally I use the word
‘red’ although I don't thing think
of a def. while doing so.”
Do you mean that whenever ˇnormally you use the word
‘red’ you have a particular feeling which you call a
feeling of justification.
I wonder if that is true.
But true or not ˇanyhow by
‘justific’ I
didn't mean a feeling.
But I think I know what makes you say that on saying
e.g. this
|
|
“But do you mean that one man couldn't play a game of
chess with himself &
|
|
How can we say he may see red although nobody may be able to find it
out? |
|
If we go through with this idea of
In which it alludes to a certain class of experiences which we know though we don't know which one of its members he has. Rather ◇◇◇ the private
|
|
One might suggest–: The word
‘t’ stands on the one hand for a
behaviour & on the other hand for a private experience.
The connection is that when a man has the
priv. exp. he
tends to behave in the particular way. But why should you talk of a priv. exp. & not 100 priv. experiences, as you don't know whether there is any red or whether there are 100? |
|
What is so confusing here is to talk of the meaning of the word instead of
the use.
The idea of different kinds of objects. |
|
Why should you know better what experiencing is like with the other person
than what seeing red is like?
If you were very careful you would say “a ’ certain something”. |
|
What does it consist in is ˇit that
happen[i|s]ng when in one case I say “I
|
|
The criteria for it being the truth
They join the rest of the rules of common lang..⌋⌋ Is there such a thing as justifying what in the particular case I do just by what ◇◇◇ then further is the case ˇand not by rule? Can I say: I am now justified in using the sentence ˇjust by what is now the case … ? No! Nor
|
|
My criteria for
|
|
Examine: ‘These two operations bring about the same
pain’.
The pain which they all bring about I shall call
t..
⌊What does this shew??⌋ ⌊Now I might explain⌋ ⌊Did I give the name ‘t.’ to a behaviour⌋ ⌊Did I call a behaviour “having toothache”?⌋ ⌊Did I call a behaviour “having the same pain”?⌋ ⌊⌊ˇBut showing t. can never be saying⌋⌋ ⌊Ich glaube ich wollte zeigen, daß ‘t.’ hier nicht als Name eines Benehmens gebraucht ist gegeben wird & daß man auch nicht auf eine Erfahrung hinten dem Benehmen zeigt.⌋ I must assume an expression which [I|is] not lying. Now do I say that there [was|is] |
|
When I say that moaning is the expression of
t. then under certain
circs. the idea possibility of it
being the expression without the feeling behind it mustn't enter
my game. |
|
Es ist Unsinn zu sagen: der Ausdruck kann immer lügen. |
|
The language games with expressions of feelings are
(private experiences) are based on ˇgames with expressions of
which we don't say that they may lie. |
|
“But was I when a baby toaght that
toothache meant my expression of toothache?” –
I was told that a certain behaviour was called expression of
toothache. |
|
“But isn't it possible that a child should behave just
as a normal child when it has t. &
not have t.?” |
|
But does if we speek of the baby, ‘having
t.’ mean the same as
‘behaving such & such’? |
|
We say “poor thing, it moans”. |
|
“Can't I in the child too, separate the moaning from
the pain.
Can't I say that I pity it because it has pain not because it
moans? |
|
You ought I suppose to say that you pity it because you believe that it
has pains.
But what is believing that it has pains like, as opposed to
|
|
“Something clicked in my
|
|
“But surely there is a case in which I'm justified to
say “I see red”, where I'm not lying, &
one where I'm not justified in saying
|
|
“But do you mean to say that the truth or falshood
of my saying ‘I see red’ does not consist in there being
red before my minds eye in one case & not in the
other; but that it depends on such things as ⌇ whether
I say it
|
|
If I say “I see red” without reason, how can I
distinguish between saying it with truth & saying it as a
lie? |
|
It is important here
|
|
Hier haben wir keinen Vergleich des Satzes mit der Wirklichkeit!
(Kollationen) |
|
Don't I know, when I say “I see red” &
I am lying, that I am lying? –
When do I translate my experience into the words expressing my
knowledge?
One might say: knowing that I am lying doesn't mean saying
that I do but being ready to say it. |
|
I could say: Lying is characterised by
|
|
“Well it is simply not seeing red & saying
“I see red”!”
There is nothing
|
| “What I now call … ” |
|
[We never dispute the opinions of common sense but we
question the expression of common sense] |
∕∕ |
Suppose I said “I see red” & was lying for I
ˇactually saw red – but had made a slip of the tongue.
But which lie was it I had said, or (rather) thought? Of course I may say later “I wanted to say “I see green” but did anything correspond to these words while I said “I see red”? |
∕∕ |
But suppose that he felt that he was lying but never said so, –
was did he know that he was lying or not? |
|
“Did he know that he was doing, what we call
lying?”
“Did he know that he was doing what on other occasions he called
lying?” |
|
What is his criterion for saying
|
|
Do these Are these two sentences ˇto say the same thing: “He sa[i|y]s he sees red &
realy sees red” & he sa[i|y]s he sees
red
|
|
“So you think seeing red consists in saying ‘I see
red’ in a certain tone of voice?” –
No, but “ saying “I see red” &
seeing it might be saying it in a certain particular tone of
voice. |
∕∕ |
How do I imagine myself seeing red?
Don't I imagine red?//
Isn't it by imagining red?!//
But how do I imagine myself addressing a meeting? |
|
Imagine a Robinson lying to
himself. –
Why is this difficult to imagine?
Look
Look at something red & say to yourself “I see green” a) meaning by ‘green’ what usually you mean by ‘red’ (i.e. speaking the truth) b) lying. |
|
But one might call it lying to onesself if one
e.g. turns ones watch forward to
make oneself believe get up
earlyer. |
∕∕ |
Falsifying an account.
I add up numbers arrive at 2730 then rub out 3 & put a 5
instead. |
|
When in this discussion we talk of lying it ought always to mean lying
to onesself subjectively lying &
by subjectively lying to the other person & not to
onesself. |
∕∕ |
If I see green without saying where “I see
green”, in what way can these words be said to describe what
I see? |
∕∕ |
One could imagine someone constantly lying subjectively but not
objectively. |
∕∕ |
Imagine this case: Someone has a particular way if lying,
he …
He allways , [lying|lies], calling red ‘green’ & green ‘red’, but as a matter of fact what he says agrees with the usage of the other people & so his lying is never noticed. // taken notice of. // |
∕∕ |
Supposing one said: [t|T]o see red means to see that
which makes me inclined to describe it by saying
‘ … ’.
“To know that I am lying means to have
|
∕∕ |
[Our language on the one hand has very much more possibilities of
expression than logicians
|
|
What makes lying “I see red” ˇinto
lying?
The
|
|
Is it wrong to say that lying in such & such cases consists in
saying so & so & feeling a
tention?
Man könnte sehr wohl sagen daß manchmal die Lüge dadurch characterisiert ist daß ich mir bewußt bin daß es sich anderes |
∕∕ |
Wenn ich nun sage “der lügt, der sagt ‘ich sehe
rot’ & sieht grün”, so stimmt das nicht, denn ich
mußte sagen “der lügt der sagt ‘ich sehe rot’
& weißt (oder glaubt) er sieht
grün”. |
∕∕ |
“Der lügt, der sagt “ich sehe rot” &
sieht die Farbe, die er selbst mit dem Worte grün bezeichnen
würde.”
Aber das heißt doch (wohl) wahrheitsgemäß
so bezeichnen würde.
Oder können wir sagen, “für sich so bezeichnen
würde”?
Daher ja die Idee daß man lügen kann indem man laut das eine & leise das andre sagt & was man laut sagt ist ˇhier die Lüge. |
∕∕ |
“Der weiß, welche Farbe er sieht, der es irgendwie
ausdrücken könnte.”
Was ist das criterium dafür daß, er
|
∕∕ |
Was soll es dann heißen: einen Farbeneindruck wahrheitsgemäß
mit ‘rot’ bezeichnen?
Paßt das Wort dem einen Eindruck besser als dem anderen? |
∕∕ |
Man könnte hier auch sagen man solle ˇgar nicht von
subjectiver Wahrheit der Farben sprechen.
Die Wahrheit des Satzes “Ich habe Zahnschmerzen” habe
nur objektiv beurteilt zu werden. |
∕∕ |
“Das wahre Wort kommt anders als das falsche.” |
∕∕ |
Man kann sagen: “Alle diese Worte sind in derselben
Weise gekommen.” |
|
Das Wort welches Du sprichst ist eine
Reaktion.
Die Reaktion die wir in dem
Satz übersehen “er sieht … ”. –
Aber ist es nicht wahr daß der Andere nicht wissen braucht, daß meine
Reaktion in dieser & dieser Weise vor sich geht?
Er meint, ich sage ihm geradeheraus was ich sehe & es
ist nicht so, sondern ich erfinde eine Lüge. |
|
“Er weiß nicht was ich sehe, bis ich es ihm sage; ich weiß es
schon vorher // ehe er es
erfährt // .”
Könnte es auch umgekehrt sein? |
|
Ich habe jetzt lange mit einem Bleistift geschrieben: wußte ich
in diesem Satz daß die Schrift grau & das Papier weiß
ist?
Wußte ich das
|
|
“Ich weiß, daß ich ˇes ihm nicht geradeheraus gesagt
habe.” –
“Ja, aber war nicht vor dieser
‘Reaktion’ schon etwas da, nämlich eben das
Erlebnis, daß ich es ihm nicht geradeheraus gesagt habe?”
|
|
“Können wir nicht doch sagen, daß etwas jedem sichtbar ,
(äußerlich),
|
|
“How am I justified in saying to myself that ˇI
see this apple as red”?
You are not justified. –
But isn't it true that when I say the truth I am justified
& when Iˇ'm lying I'm not
justified. |
|
How is a ly possible in a case where there is no
justification? |
|
Supposing one said, lying (here) consists in applying one word to
the colour
|
|
I am justif. if the word comes in
one way, & not justif. if it comes
in an other way.
–But in which way? –
If it comes in the straightforward way I'm justified.
But which is the straightforward way? –
I know but can't explain as the paradigm of it is in
me. –
But as far as it's in you it serves no purpose in the future
application of the word.
(priv.
ostens.
def. |
|
How do I know that it comes in the straightforward way?
What the str. way is must be fixed
by a paradigm. |
|
“Why on earth should it be wrong to use a word not in the simple
(‘straightforward’) way?”
Couldn't it not even be my duty to use the word which
doesn't come straightforwardly?
Imagine the case where we had laid down a code in which
‘red’ meant green. |
|
“I said the word with a bad conscience.”
|
|
What troubles me are the prop. in which
an action is described accompanied by a ‘state of
mind’. |
∕∕ |
“Lying when you say “I see red” consists
in saying these words & having a private experience which I call
un ‘feeling unjustified’, or
‘seeing green’ etc.” –
“But suppose that I call the feeling of being justified
“feeling
unjustified”!?” –
|
∕∕ |
“What you say comes to this: that when
|
|
“You either have a feeling of being unjustified or you
don't!” |
∕∕ |
“But surely there is a case in which I say ‘I see
red’ & am telling the (subjective) truth &
one in which I tell a
ly!” –
Yes, that is, we distinguish between
|
∕∕ |
When we talk of the private experiencec which the
others don't know we originally ⇄ don't
mean to talk of a shapeless nothing but of a variable with certain
definite values. |
∕∕ |
It is said sometimes that if I & someone else are looking at some
object I can never know what colour the other really sees.
But with what
… . But the word ‘to have’ could here only help us if it had no meaning at all & then it couldn't help us. But as long as ‘to have’ here has any meaning at all it can't help us & when it has no meaning at all ˇI think it can't help us either. |
∕∕ |
“We distinguish between … & … ”
that means: We some times sometimes use the expression
“I lied when I said that I saw green”
|
∕∕ |
The word lying is taught us in a part way in
which it was fastened to a gr certain behaviour to the use
of a certain expression under certain circumstances.
Then we use it saying that we have been lying when we our have
noticed it behaviour was not the one like the one which first
constituted the meaning. Just in the same way we were taught the word ‘red’ in a game say like No1 & then we use it when the conditions are different (compare the past in the description of a dream) (and of course it isn't just the word ‘red’ we use but the whole imagery connected with it) |
∕∕ |
“But you talk as though there was only the
|
∕∕ |
But is all that happens that you say ‘I see
red’?
Isn't there something else being the case, happening, when you
say this & it is true?
But if you ask isn't there something else happening, you
don't mean just anything else e.g. that
it's raining.
So after all you'll have to give descriptions of what
|
∕∕ |
The philosophical puzzle seems insoluble if we are
franc
|
∕∕ |
‘Expression ˇcan always ˇbe
lying’ How can we say this of the expression to which
|
∕∕ |
“But I always know whether I'm lying or
not!” – You are
|
|
But (then) I'm always either lying or not lying!
(Whether I ˇalways know it or not) |
|
[Is there always a link between reality & our
expressions?] |
∕∕ |
Suppose a child learnt the word ‘toothache’ as an
equivalent for it's moaning & noticed that
whenever it said the word or moaned the grown-ups treated it
particularly well.
The child then uses moaning or the word
‘t.’ as a means to bring
about the desired effect: is the child lying?
|
|
You say: A grown-up “Surely I can
moan with toothache & I can moan without toothache, so why
shouldn't the child be able it be so with the
child?
Of course I only see
Now one can moan because one has pains or, or e.g., one can moan on the stage. How do I know that the child, small as it is, doesn't already act & in this case I teach it to mean by ‘toothache’ something I don't
|
∕∕ ∕∕ |
I have taught the child to use the expression ‘I have
toothache’
But now I also teach the child to moan on the stage! That is to say I ˇeven teach
In fact I could teach it to lie, as a separate language game. (In fact we often play this kind of game with children) |
∕∕ |
“But doesn't what you say come to this that it
doesn't matter what the persons feel as long as only they behave a
particular way?” |
∕∕ |
“But “Do you mean that you can define pain
in terms of behaviour?”
But is this what we do if we teach the child to use the expression ‘I have toothache’? Did I
|
∕∕ |
“But aren't you neglecting something – the
experience or whatever you might call it –?
Almost the world behind the mere words?”
|
∕∕ |
But here solipsism
‘I neglect that which goes without saying.’ |
|
“What is seen , I see” (pointing to
my body) I point at my
|
|
Back to ‘neglecting’!
It seems that I neglect life.
But not life physiologically understood but life as consciousness.
And consciousness not physiologically understood; but or, understood
from the outside, but consciousness as the very essence of experience,
& the appearance of the world, the world.
|
|
Couldn't I say: if I had to add the world to my language
it would have to be one sign for the whole of language which sign could
therefore be left out. |
|
⍈
Isn't what you reproach me of as though you said:
“In your language you're only speaking!” |
|
How am I to describe the way the child learns the word
‘toothache’ – like this?
The child sometimes has t. it moans
ˇ& holds its cheek, the
grown up[p|s] say “ … ”
etc..
Or: The child sometimes moans & holds its cheek,
– the grown-ups … ”?
Does the first description say something superfluous ˇor false or
does the second leave out something essential?
Both descriptions are correct |
|
“But it seems as if you were neglecting
something.”
But what more can I do than distinguish the cases of saying
‘I have t.’ when I
ˇreally have t., & the case
of saying ˇthe words without having ˇthe
t.?
I am
¥ • |
|
‒ ‒ ‒But why shouldn't I say “I have
t. in his tooth”.
I would insist on his tooth being extracted.
Who
|
|
What does it mean distributing primary experience over all
subjects?
Imagine that they have all real toothaches in their
teeth.
The one which now only I have.
I now describe certain facts.
(Not metaphysical ones but facts about the
|
|
He gets a blow ˇ& cries, – I think: “no
wonder for it really hurts”.
But wouldn't I say to myself: Queer that
he cries for I feel the pain all right, – but
he?! |
|
What does it consist in that I have pain, I feel
myself crying, I hear that I am crying, my
mouth cries? |
|
It seems there is a phenomenon which in general I refer to as ‘my
toothache’ which, experience teaches me, is ˇalways
connected with one particular person (not ‘I’ but)
L.W..
I now imagine facts other than they are & connect up this
phenomenon to all sorts of persons so as to make it not at all tempting to
call this phenomenon ‘my toothache’. Isn't it a particular phenomenon to hear myself speak (not, ‘to hear L.W. speak’). ‒ ‒ ‒ |
∕∕ |
“I see so & so” does not mean
“The person so & so ˇe.g.
L.W. sees so
& so”. |
|
A ˇlang. game in which everybody
calls out what he sees but without saying “I see
… ”.
Could anybody say that what Th I call out
is incomplete because I have left out to mention the
person?! |
|
A language game in which everybody (& I too) call out what
I see without mentioning me. |
|
They allways know what I see.
If they don't seem to, I misunderstand what they say.
|
|
I am tempted to say: “It seems ˇat least
a fact of experience that at the source of the visual field there
is mostly a small man with gray [t|f]lanel trousers in
fact L.W.”. –
If Someone might answer me to this: It is
true
|
|
“Ich bin doch be[f|v]orzugt.
Ich bin der Mittelpunkt der Welt.”
Denken wir uns ich sähe mich in einem Spiegel das sagen & auf mich
zeigen!
Wäre es noch richtig?
When I say that I play a unique role I really mean the geometrical eye. |
|
On the other hand if I describe the usual appearance of my body around the
geometrical eye this is on the same level as saying that I see in the
middle of the visual field there is in general a brown table & at
the edges a white wall (as I generally sit in my room).
Now suppose I described this in the form: The visual world in general is like this: (follows the description). Would this be wrong? – Why should it be wrong?! But the question is, what game
|
∕∕ |
Can't I say something to nobody, neither to anybody else
nor to myself?
What is the criterium of saying it to myself? |
|
If I see a fire he runs to extinguish it. |
|
At intervals I paint what I see.
But can't someone else paint it for me?
Or the picture be presented to me somehow, already
finished? |
|
What, if I see before me a picture of the room as I am seeing the
room?
Is this a lang. game? |
|
I want to say: “the visual world is like this
… ”,– but why say anything? |
|
Der Solipsismus // Die Auffassung des
Solipsismus // erstreckt sich nicht auf Spiele.
Der Andere
I.e., when we play a lang. game we are on the same level. |
|
“I am in the lucky position of being in the source of the
visual
|
|
⍈
But the point is that I don't establish a relation between a
person & what is seen.
All I do is that alternately I point in front of me & to
myself. |
|
But sure what I now see,
(Der Solipsist flattert & flattert in der Fliegenglocke, schlägt sich an den Wänden, flattert weiter. stößt sich an den Wänden, flattert weiter. Wie ist er zur Ruhe zu |
|
You use “
|
|
“(Description)”: this is the visual
world”.
But why do you say visual & why do you say that it's the
world? |
|
“A red patch is (now) at the
center”.
All others must say “I see … ”.
But is this distinction necessary, as I know anyhow who's saying
it, I whether I or one of the others? |
|
But the real question ˇfor me is here: How am I
defined?
Who is it, that is favoured?
I.
But may I lift up my head to indicate who it is?
– Supposing I constantly change & my surrounding does: is there still some continuity namely by it being me & my surrounding that
|
|
(Isn't this similar to thinking that when
|
|
But is my hand favoured as compared to someone else's
hand I see?
ˇThis is ridiculous.
Then either nobody is favoured or I am, that is then person
L.W. whose hand
lifted. |
|
All right, – when I, L.W., see what's seen! |
|
Where is my toothache?
I.e. how is its place determined?
|
|
“What I now see justif. me in
saying that I see red”.
And what do you now see?
I don't see what I see more definitely if at the same time I see my finger pointing to it. (The question ought to have been what are you now looking at). I don't tell myself what it is I see by
Suppose I said: “What I now see justif. me in saying “I see red” because it is the same colour as this sample”,
|
|
Is the criterion for my playing a private game of chess my being however
strongly inclined to say that I am playing one)?
|
|
How does one feel whether I am strongly inclined?
|
|
What would I say if I cam in my
priv. judgements came into contradiction with
all other people.
I.e. if I could no longer play a
lang. game with them.
Or if all the facts round me became
extraordinary?
Would I stick to my judgements? |
|
Suppose someone asked me “What does it mean to play a
private game of chess with oneself” & I answered:
“Anything, because if I ◇◇◇ said that I was playing
a game of chess I would be so
⌊⌊ Under what circ. would we say that he did what we call portraying & under what circ. that he called something portraying which we didn't call that? Suppose here we said: Well I can never know what he does inwardly would this be anything than resignation? ⌋⌋ |
|
Suppose someone painted pictures of the landscape which surrounds it, he
sometimes paints the leaves of trees orange sometimes blue, sometimes the
clear sky red etc.
Under what circumstances would we agree with him that he was
portraying the landscape? |
|
We call something a calculation if, for instance, it leads to a house
being built. ¥ • |
|
But can't he play a game with the colournames against whatever
anybody else sais?
But why should we call it a game with the colournames.
“But if I played it I would stick to saying that I was
playing a game with the colournames.”
But is that all I can say about it; is all that I can say for its being
this kind of game that I stick to calling it so? |
| ⍈ ↺
We call something a lang. game if it plays
a particular role in our
|
|
Under what circumstances
|
|
If the “
|
|
Roughly speaking: The
|
|
But if “I have t.”
stands for a
One might say: it too stands for a moan, that of compassion. |
|
“T., seeing etc.
I only know from myself & not from the other.”
“I never know that he has t., I only know when I have it.” “I can only believe that he has it, that he has what I have.” “Has ‘t.’ then a different meaning in my case & in his?” “Isn't it possible that everybody should have t. ˇbut without expressing it?” “If it is possible that sometimes one can have ‘t.’ without expressing it, it is possible that always ◇◇◇ this should be so.” “If my personal experience is all I know how can I even assume that there is any other besides?” “Does ‘t.’ in the other mean behaviour?” “I ˇonly know what I mean by ‘t.’.” “I was taught the word ‘t.’ in connection with my behaviour but interpreted it to mean my pain.” “Only my ‘t.’ is real t.”. “What justifies me in saying that the other has t. is his behaviour, what just. me saying that I have is the experience of t..” “Is there only the expression of t. & not the t.?” “I know what it means to say that the other has ‘t.’ even if I have no means to find out whether he has.” |
|
“Only he knows whether he has t.,
we can never know.”
“Does the I enter into the personal experience or not?” |
| •
We aren't lying ˇare speaking the truth
if a fact corresponds to the sentence.
This is no explanation at all but a mere repetition unless we
can supplement it by ‘namely this↗’ & a
demonstration & the whole explanation lies just in this
demonstration.
The whole problem here only arose through the fact
that in this case the demonstration is of a different
kind, that the demonstration of ‘I see
red’, ‘I have t.’
seems indirect to be a demonstration. in a different
sense than the term of
•
If I say we must assume an expression which can't lie this
can't be explained by saying, that really
pain corresponds to this
expression. |
|
“But aren't you saying, that
I am saying that there is nothing behind the moaning. |
|
“Do you deny that the moaning is the expression of
something”.
No, that is I too should call moaning an expression (or even an
expression of something though this is misleading).
But the word expression here only characterizes the
lang. game played with it.
I react differently
|
|
“So, you don't really have pain, you just
moan?!” –
There seems to be a description of my behaviour & also, in the
same sense a description of my experience my pain!
The one so to speak the description of an external the other of an
internal fact.
This corresponds to the idea that it in the sense in which I can give
a part of my body a name
I can give a name to a private experience (only
indirectly)
And I am drawing your attention to this that the lang. games are
|
|
You couldn't call moaning a description!
But this shows you how far the
prop. “I have
t.” is from a
‘description’, & how far teaching the use of the
word t. is from teaching the word
tooth.
|
|
One could from the beginning teach the child the expression “I
think he has toothache” ˇinstead of “he has
t.” with the
corresponding
But why not in the childs own case? Because there the tone of voice is simply determined by nature. |
|
In “I have t.” the
expression of pain is brought to the same form as a description “I
|
|
We teach the child to say “I have been lying” when it
has behaved in a certain way. ⌊⌊ˇ
Imagine here a typical case of a ly ⌋⌋
Also this expression goes along with a
But doesn't the child know that it is lying before ever I teach him the
|
|
We teach the child the use of the word “to
speak”.
= Later it uses the expression “I
|
|
The Surely the ˇdescr. of
the facial expr.
|
|
Imagine a lang. in which toothache is
called “moaning” & the difference between just
moaning & moaning with pain is expressed by the moaning or
dryc tone in which the word is pronounced.
People would not say in this lang. that it became clear later on that |
|
Supposed Suppose he sais to himself
“I lie”,
|
|
But couldn't one say that if I speak of a
man's angry voice meaning that he was angry & again of his
angry voice not meaning that he was angry in the first case the meaning of
the description of his voice was much further reaching than in the
second case?
I will admit that our description in the first case
doesn't omit anything & is as complete as
though we had said that he really was angry, – but somehow the meaning
of the expression then
|
|
But how does it do that?
The answer to this would be an explanation of the
“Then is there nothing under the surface?!” But I said that I was going to distinguish two expressions, one for the ‘surface’ & one for ‘what is below the surface’ only remember that these expressions themselves correspond just to a picture, not to its usage. It is just as misleading to say that there is
But // Because we naturally use
|
∕∕ |
Now in order that with its normal meaning we should teach a child the
expression “I have lied” the child must behave
in the normal way.
E.g. it must under certain
circs. ‘admit’ that it
lied, it must do so with a certain facial expression etc.
etc. etc..
We may not always find out whether he lied or not but if we never found
out the word would have a different meaning.
“But once he has learnt the word he can't be in doubt
whether he is lying or not!” –
Consider the case of the person who finds that his subjective lies
are ◇◇◇ judged by the ordinary criteria, ◇◇◇
truths.
He sais that he has been to school feeling that
it's a ly but the teacher ˇ& the boys
confirms that he has been etc.
etc..
You might say: “But surely he can't
be in doubt that he said a subjective
ly”.
But suppose he said “I've been to
school” This ˇof course is like saying that he can't be in doubt ˇabout whether he has toothache or whether he sees red etc. On the one hand: doubting whether I have the experience E is not like doubting whether someone else has it. Remember what we said about the assymetry of the game № 1. On the other hand
Doubting e.g. whether to say “I see red” or “I see green”. “But this is a simple doubt about the appelation of a colour & ˇit can be settled by asking someone what this colour (pointing) is called”. But are all such doubts doubts about what people removable by this question (or which comes to the same by giving a definition “I shall call this colour so & so”)? |
|
“What colour do you see?” –
“I don't know – is it red, or
isn't it red; I don't know what colour it is I
see.” –
“What on earth do you mean What do you
mean?
Is the colour constantly changing, or do you see it so very faintly
practically black?”
Now Could I say ˇthen: “don't
you see what you see?”
I this obviously would make no sense. |
|
Colour:
|
|
“What colour do you call: a, e, i, o or
u?” –
“I don't know which colour I
see?” |
|
“Primary colours are those used in flags”
It is queer that one never uses brown on a flag & says it is a blend of yellow, black & red although nobody can really produce a proper brown by mixing these colours. |
|
Is there a reason for not admitting brown as a primary
colour?
Is it not enough that we refuse to group it with red, blue, green, etc.? |
|
One sometimes thinks the reason is that we see transitions from brown to
ˇpure yellow, red, black; but so we do in the case of red
etc. |
|
Imagine all objects around us where irridescent, I mean of the appearance
of a white
|
|
Shall we say that a pointillist sees the objects as he paints
them? |
|
It seems as though, however the outward
circs. change, once the
To say that I can't doubt whether [to say|I see] red is in a sense absurd as the game I play with the expression “I see red” doesn't contain a doubt of this form. It seems, – whatever the circumstances I always know now whether to apply the word or not. It seems, at first it was a move in a special game, but then it becomes independent of this game. (This reminds one of the way the idea of length seems to become emancipated from any particular method of measuring it.) |
|
We are tempted to say: “damn it all, a rod has a
particular length however I express it.
And one could go on to say that if I see a rod I always see
ˇ(know) how long it is although I can't say
how many feet, meters etc. – But suppose I just
say: I always know whether its
|
/ |
But can't the ˇold game loose its
point when the circs. change, so
that the
|
/ |
He sticks to to saying that he has been lying although
none of the normal consequences follow.
What is there left of the lang. game,
except that he sais the expression? |
∕∕ |
We learn the word ‘red’ under
part.
circs.
Certain objects are usually red & keep their colour, most people
agree with us in our colour judgements.
Suppose all this changes: I see blood unaccountably sometimes one
sometimes another colour & the people around me all make different
statements.
But couldn't I in all this chaos retain
Samples e.g. would all constantly change their colour – ‘or ◇◇◇ changing the meaning does it only seem so to me?’ “Now am I mad or have I really called this ‘red’ yesterday?” |
∕∕ |
The situation in which we are inclined to say “I must have gone
mad!” |
∕∕ |
“But we could always call a colour-impression
‘red’ & stick to it this
application!” |
|
Die Atmosphäre man die dieses Problem umgibt ist
schrecklich.
Dichte Nebel der Sprache sind um den problematischen Punkt
gelagert.
Es ist beinahe unmöglich dazu zu kennen zu ihm
vorzudringen. |
|
Suppose I said had before me drawings of what I & other
people now see & I said of the drawing of what I see “there
is something unique about this picture”. |
|
If I can speak about ‘what is seen’, why
shouldn't anyone else speak about it? –
But I have a feeling that only I can; if I assume that others also speak
about what normally I should call my visual image there seems to me to be
something
If ‘what I see’ has nothing to do with a particular person why should I feel that there's something wrong in assuming that anybody might talk about it i.e. mean it when he speaks? Then of course I can't tell them what I see nor they me what they see any more than I can tell myself what I see. But they could make conjectures as to what might happen in future in our visual field. In the normal game I say: “I don't know what they see, they've got to say what they see”, – but in the game I'm concidering they would as much know what I see as my hand can wri[g|t]e down what my mouth can say. And their ˇdifferent conjecture would be like conjectures made by myself at different times. Can my mouth tell my hand what I see in order that my hand should be able to write it down? |
|
Do I by painting what I see tell myself what I see?
|
|
“This picture is ◇◇◇ unique, for it represents what is
really seen”.
What justification do I have to say this // What is my justification for saying this? // |
|
I see two spotts on this wall & lift two
fingers.
Do I tell myself that I see two spots?
But on the other hand couldn't this be the sign that for
my seeing two spots?! |
|
Ist das Bild ausgezeichnet oder zeichne ich es aus?
|
|
“Today he points to me, & yesterday he pointed
to me also.” |
|
The meaning of: “He points [to|at]
me. |
|
“I see that he points at A”
“I see that he points at me” |
|
You seem to be able to give yourself a sort of ostensive
explana-
|
∕∕ |
Imagine a game: a group of people tell each other A
tells B what B sees B tells A what A sees
One person tells the other what he (the other) sees if he has
guessed it rightly he is rewarded.
If A hasn't guessed correctly what B sees B
corrects him & says what it is he sees.
This game could be like is more instructive if we imagine the
persons not to say what is seen but to paint it or ˇto make models of
it. –
Now let me imagine that I am one of them. pl.
the players.
Wouldn't I be tempted to say: “The game is asymmetrical, for only what I say I see corresponds to a visual image. |
|
The [P|p]roblem lies thus: This
↗) is what is seen;
& this is also what I see. |
|
Frage Dich: Kann das ↗) nur ich
sehen, ober kann es auch ein Andrer sehen?
|
|
Für mich existiert kein Unterschied zwischen ich &
das↗; & das
Wort “ich” ist für mich kein Signal, das einen Ort
oder eine Person
|
|
Ich versuche das ganz Problem auf das
|
|
When I
|
|
It is as though there was a magic power in the words
“this is … ”. |
|
I can bring myself to say: There is no toothache there
↗ (in the
man's cheek who says he has toothache).
And what would be the expression for this in ordinary language?
Wouldn't it be my saying “I have no
toothache there”? |
|
“But who says this?” –
“I!”
And who says
|
|
Suppose I give this rule: “Whenever I said
‘I have t.’, I shall from
now on say ‘there is
t.’”. |
|
I tell the waiter bring me always clear soup & thick soup to
the others.
He tries to remember my face.
Suppose I change my face (body) every day entirely, how is he to know which is me. But it's a question of the existence of the game. “If all chessmen were alike how should one know which is the king?” Now it seems that, although he couldn't know which is me, I still
Suppose now I said: “it wasn't so & so, it was I who asked for clear soup”, – couldn't I be wrong? Certainly. I.e. I may think that I asked him, but didn't. Now are there two mistakes I can make: one, thinking that I asked him, the other, thinking that I asked him? I say: “I remember having asked you yesterday”, he replies: “You weren't there ˇat all yesterday”. Now I could say either |
|
It seems that I can trace my identity quite independent of the
identity of my body.
And the idea is suggested that I trace the identity of something
dwelling in a body the identity of my mind. |
|
|
“If anybody asks me to describe what I see, I describe
what's seen.” |
|
What we call a description of my sense datum, of what's seen,
independent of what is the case in the physical world, is
ˇstill a description for the other person. |
|
If I speak of a description of my sense datum I don't
mean to give a particular person as its
possessor.
(No more do I want to speak about a particular person when I moan with pain.) |
|
It must be a serious & deep-seated
desease of language (one might also say ‘of
thought’) which makes me say: “Of course
this ↗) is
what's really seen”. |
|
|
I can tell you the fact p because I know that p is the
case.
But It has sense to say “it rained & I knew
it” but not “I had toothache & knew that I
had.
“I know that I have toothache” means nothing
or the same as “I have toothache”.
This, however, is a remark about the use of the word “I”, whoever uses it. |
|
Compare with this such a statement as: “
|
|
Think of the
|
|
The
|
|
“If I am asked ‘what do you see?’, I
describe the visual world.” –
Couldn't I say instead of this “ … I am describing
what's is
there↗”
ˇ(pointing before me)? |
|
But now consider the case of someone having a picture before him of the
part of his room he ˇis seeing & that he's
saying: “this in the picture is like this (a
part of his visual field, as he is looking at his
room).” |
1) Continuation from Ms-148,48v.
2) See facsimile; line connecting this remark with the following one.
To cite this element you can use the following URL:
BOXVIEW: http://www.wittgensteinsource.org/BTE/Ms-149_d