Suppose I explain: “By
‘Moses’ I
understand || mean the man, if
such a
person || one existed, who
led the Isr
aelites out of
Egypt
, || ; whatever
he may have
been called then || may have been his name and whatever else
he may have done or not
have
done”.
But
the same sort of doubt is
possible regarding the words of this explanation as there is || regarding
the words of this explanation the same sort of doubts are possible as are
possible about the name
“Moses” (what do you
call “Egypt”, whom do you call “the
Isr
aelites”,
etc.).
In fact, these questions
don't even come to an end when we
have || wouldn't come to an end even if we had
reached words like “red”, “dark”,
“
old || sweet”.
–
“But how
can || can an
explanation help me to
an
understanding || understand,
then, || , if
it isn't || it's
never the
final || ultimate
one?
The || That
means the explanation is never
finished,
then || completed; I still don't
understa
nd, and never will, what he means.”
As though an explanation
would hang || hung,
as it were, in the air unless
there were another to support it || another
supported it || another one supported it.
Whereas although an
explanation may rest on another that one has given,
none || An || One explanation may rest on
another explanation which has been given, but no explanation
is in
need of || needs another
, –
unless
we need it in order to avoid a misunderstanding.
We
may || might say: an
explanation serves to remove a misunderstanding or to prevent
one
, – || –
one, that
is, || that is, one which would arise
if there
were not the || without that
explanation
, || ; but not
,
every || any one
that I
can || could
imagine.
It
may || can easily appear as
though every doubt
showed || were || was
only || just a symptom of
an existing || some existing
gap in the
foundation || foundations,
so that a
sure || well-founded
understanding is only
62
¤ possible if we first doubt
everything that
can be doubted, and then remove all these
doubts.