We now have a
theory (a
“ || ‘dynamical
” || ’
theory of the proposition, etc.) but it does not
seem || appear like a theory.
It || For
it is a characteristi
c of
this
sort of || such a theory that it
examines || looks at a
special || particular, clearly
visible || illuminating || illustrative
case and says
, || :
“
That || This
shows the way it always is; this case is the prototype of
all
cases.” –
“Of course
; || , it must be like
that || that's how it must be”,
we say, and are satisfied.
We have
hit || come
upon || found a form of
description
that || presentation which
attracted || attracts,
is evident to us || satisfies us.
But it is as though we
had now seen || now
saw something
which lies beneath the
surface. || which lies under the
surface. This || Now
this tendency to generali
se the clear case seems
in logic to
have its strict
justification || be strictly
justified; || :
here
for once we seem to be
fully justified in
conclu
ding: “If
one
proposition is a picture,
then every proposition must be a
picture, for they must all
be the same in essence || have the
same nature || be of the same
essence || nature.”
For we are under the delusion that what is
72
¤ sublime
, what is essential in our
inquiry || about our enquiry || investigation, its
essential features, consists in
the || this
fact || lies in this that it grasps one all
comprehending
essence || entity.