​ 
  “So if I say ‘he has toothache’ I am supposing that he has what I have if I have toothache.” Suppose I said: “If I say ‘I suppose’ he has toothache I am supposing that he has what I have if I have toothache”, – this would be like saying “If I say ‘this cushion is red’ I mean that it has the same colour which the sofa has if it is red”. But this wasn't what
was meant
I intended to say
 with the first sentence. I wished to say that talking about his toothache at all was based upon a supposition, a supposition which ˇby its very nature essence could not be veryfied.

 

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.



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