The criteria for it being the truth have to be laid down beforehand in common language || are laid down in language (rules, charts etc.). “But how am I to know how in the particular case to apply them?” – For if || as far as they are laid down || For, being laid down … || For in so far as they

are laid down in common language they join the rest of what is thus laid down || are || become just part of the common language game i.e. they don't help me in any particular case. They join in with all the rest of … not helping me || & don't help me in my particular private decision.
They join the rest of the rules of common language.
Is there such a thing as justifying what in the particular case I do just by what then further is the case and not by rule? Can I say: I am now justified in using the sentence just by what is now the case … ?
No!
Nor can I say || does it help me to say I am justified “when I feel justified”. For about feeling justified the same things can be said as about feeling toothache.

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.