∕∕ |
Now in order that with its normal meaning we should teach a child the
expression “I have lied” the child must behave
in the normal way.
E.g. it must under certain
circs. ‘admit’ that it
lied, it must do so with a certain facial expression etc.
etc. etc..
We may not always find out whether he lied or not but if we never found
out the word would have a different meaning.
“But once he has learnt the word he can't be in doubt
whether he is lying or not!” –
Consider the case of the person who finds that his subjective lies
are ◇◇◇ judged by the ordinary criteria, ◇◇◇
truths.
He sais that he has been to school feeling that
it's a ly but the teacher ˇ& the boys
confirms that he has been etc.
etc..
You might say: “But surely he can't
be in doubt that he said a subjective
ly”.
But suppose he said “I've been to
school” This ˇof course is like saying that he can't be in doubt ˇabout whether he has toothache or whether he sees red etc. On the one hand: doubting whether I have the experience E is not like doubting whether someone else has it. Remember what we said about the assymetry of the game № 1. On the other hand
Doubting e.g. whether to say “I see red” or “I see green”. “But this is a simple doubt about the appelation of a colour & ˇit can be settled by asking someone what this colour (pointing) is called”. But are all such doubts doubts about what people removable by this question (or which comes to the same by giving a definition “I shall call this colour so & so”)? |
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