There seems at first sight to be a certain ambiguity in what is meant by saying that a prop. is ‘true’, owing to the fact that it seems as if in the case of different props. the way in wh. they correspond to the facts which co to wh. they correspond is quite different. But what is really common to all cases is that they must have the general form of a proposition. In giving the general form of a prop. you are explaining what kind of way of putting together the symbols of things & relations will correspond to (be analogous to) the things having those relations in reality. In doing this you are saying what is meant by saying that a prop. is true; & you must do it once for all. To say a prop. f “This prop. has sense” means ⌊“⌋“This prop. is true” means …” (“p” is true = “p” . p . Def. ): only instead of “p”, we must have introduce the general form of a prop..)

(2015–) Wittgenstein Source Bergen Nachlass Edition (WS-BNE). Edited by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen under the direction of Alois Pichler. In: Wittgenstein Source, curated by Alois Pichler (2009–) and Joseph Wang-Kathrein (2020–). (N) Bergen: WAB.