Of course one of the reasons why we are
tempted to make our pseudo-statement is its similarity with the
statement “I only see this”, or
“this is the region which I see”, where I point
to certain objects around me, as opposed to others, or in a certain
direction in physical space (not in visual space), as opposed
to other directions in physical space. And if, pointing
in this sense, I say “this is what is really
seen”, one may answer me: “This is
what
you, L.W., see; but there is no objection to adopting a
notation in which what we used to call ‘things which
L.W.
sees’ is called ‘things really
seen’”. If, however, I believe that
by pointing to that which in my grammar has no neighbour I can
convey something to myself (if not to others), I make a
mistake similar to that of thinking that the sentence,
“I am here” makes sense to me (and, by
the way, is always true) under conditions different from those
very special conditions under which it does make sense.
(E.g., when my voice and the direction
from which I speak is recognized by another person.)
‒ ‒ ‒ Again an important case where you can
121.
learn that a word has
meaning by the particular use we make of it. We are like
people who think that pieces of wood shaped more or less like chess
or draught pieces and standing on a chess board make a game, even
if nothing has been said as to how they are to be used.