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It is an important remark concerning this example and others which we
give that one may object to the description which we give of the language
of a tribe, that in the specimens we give of their language we let them
speak English, thereby already presupposing the whole background of the
English language, that is, our usual meanings of the words.
Thus if I say that in a certain language there is no special verb
for “skipping”, but that this language uses instead the
form “making
40.
the test for throwing the
boomerang”, one may ask how I have characterized the use of the
expressions, “make a test for” &
“throwing the boomerang”, to be justified in substituting
these English expressions for whatever their actual words may be.
To this we must answer that we have only given a very sketchy
description of the practices of our fictitious languages, in some cases
only hints, but that one can easily make these descriptions more
complete.
Thus in 48) I could have said that the examiner uses orders for
making the men go through the tests.
These orders all begin with one particular expression which I could
translate into the English words, “Go through the
test”.
And this expression is followed by one which in actual warfare is used
for certain actions.
Thus there is a command upon which men throw their boomerangs and which
therefore I should translate into, “Throw the
boomerangs”.
Further, if a man gives an account of the battle to his chief, he again
uses the expression I have translated into “Throw a
boomerang”, this time in a description.
Now what characterizes an order as such or a description as such or
a question as such, etc., is – – as we have said
– – the rôle which the utterance of these signs plays in the whole
practice of the language.
That is to say, whether a word of the language of our tribe is rightly
translated into a
word of the English language depends upon the rôle this
word plays in the whole life of the tribe; the occasions on which it
is used, the expressions of emotions by which it is generally
accompanied, the ideas which it generally awakens or which prompt its
saying, etc. etc.
As an exercise ask yourself: in which
41.
cases would you say that a
certain word uttered by the people of the tribe was a greeting?
In which cases should we say it corresponded to our
“Goodbye”, in which to our
“Hello”?
In which cases would you say that a word of a foreign language
corresponded to our “perhaps”? – – to our
expressions of doubt, trust, certainty?
You will find that the justifications for calling
something an expression of doubt, conviction, etc.
largely, though of course not wholly, consist in descriptions of
gestures, the play of facial expressions, and even the tone of
voice.
Remember at this point that the personal experiences of an emotion must
in part be strictly localized experiences; for if I frown in anger I feel
the muscular tension of the frown in my forehead, & if I weep,
the sensations around my eyes are obviously part, and an important part,
of what I feel.
This is, I think, what William James meant when he said that a man doesn't cry
because he is sad but that he is sad because he cries.
The reason why this point is often not understood is that we think
of the utterance of an emotion as though it were some artificial device
to let others know that we have it.
Now there is no sharp line between such “artificial
devices” and what one might call the natural expressions of
emotion.
Cf. in this respect: a) weeping,
b) raising one's voice when one is angry,
c) writing an angry letter, d)
ringing the bell for a servant you wish to scold. |
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