The idea of a proposition saying something about what will happen in
the future is even more liable to puzzle us than the idea of a
proposition about the past.
For comparing future events with past events, one may almost be inclined
to say that
51.
though the past events
do not really exist in the full light of day, they exist in an underworld
into which they have passed out of the real life; whereas the future
events do not even have this shadowy existence.
We could, of course, imagine a realm of the unborn, future
events, whence they come into reality and pass into the realm of the
past; and, thinking || if we think in terms of this
metaphor, we may be surprised that the future should appear less existent
than the past.
Remember, however, that the grammar of our temporal
expressions is not symmetrical with respect to an origin corresponding
with the present moment.
Thus the grammar of the expressions relating to memory does not
reappear “with opposite sign” in the grammar of the
future tense. || Thus there is nothing in the grammar of the future tense
corresponding to the grammar of the word “memory”. This part of the grammar of the past tense does not recur
“with its sign changed” on the future
side.
This is the reason why it has been said that propositions concerning
future events are not really propositions.
And to say this, is all right as long as it isn't meant to be
more than a decision about the use of the term
“proposition”; a decision which, though not agreeing
with the common usage of the word “proposition”, may come
natural to human beings under certain circumstances.
If a philosopher says that propositions about the future are not
real propositions, it is because he has been struck by the asymmetry
in the grammar of temporal expressions.
The danger is, however, that he imagines he has
made a kind of scientific statement about “the nature of the
future”. 52.
57). A game is played in this
way: A man throws a die, and before throwing he draws on a
piece of paper some one of the six faces of the die.
If, after having thrown, the face of the die turning up is the one he
has drawn, he feels (expresses) satisfaction.
If a different face turns up, he is dissatisfied.
Or, let there be two partners and every time one guesses correctly what
he will throw his partner pays him a penny, and if incorrectly, he pays
his partner.
Drawing the face of the die will under the circumstances
of this game be called “making a guess” or a
“conjecture”. 58). In a certain tribe contests are held in running, putting the weight, etc. and the spectators stake money || possessions on the competitors. The pictures of all the competitors are placed in a row, and what I called the spectators' staking property on one of the competitors consists in laying this property (pieces of gold) under one of the pictures. If a man has placed his gold under the picture of the winner in the competition he gets back his stake doubled. Otherwise he loses his stake. Such a custom we should undoubtedly call betting, even if we observed it in a society whose language held no scheme for stating “degrees of probability”, “chances” and the like. I assume that the behaviour of the spectators expresses great keenness and excitement before and after the result || outcome of the bet is known. I further imagine that on examining the placing of the bets I can understand “why” they were thus placed. I mean: In a competition between two wrestlers, mostly the bigger man is the favorite; or if the smaller, I find that he has shown greater 53.
strength on previous occasions,
or that the bigger had recently been ill, or had neglected his
training, etc.
Now this may be so although the language of the tribe does not express
reasons for the placing of the bets.
That is to say, nothing in their language corresponds to our saying,
e.g., “I bet on this man because he has
kept fit, whereas the other has neglected his training”, and
such like.
I might describe this state of affairs by saying that my
observation has taught me certain causes for their placing
their bets as they do, but that the bettors had || used no
reasons for acting as they did. |
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