Let us then consider the proposition, “Believing
something can not merely consist in saying that you believe it, you must
105.
say it with a particular facial
expression, gesture, and tone of voice.”
Now it cannot be doubted that we regard certain facial expressions,
gestures, etc. as characteristic for the expression of
belief.
We speak of a “tone of conviction”.
And yet it is clear that this tone of conviction isn't always
present whenever we rightly speak of conviction wherever
we should say there was conviction.
“Just so”, you might say, “this shews that
there is something else, something behind these gestures,
etc. which is the real belief as opposed to mere
expressions of belief.” ‒ ‒
“Not at all”, I should say, “many
different criteria distinguish, under different circumstances,
cases of believing what you say from those of not believing what you
say.”
There may be cases where the presence of a sensation other than those
bound up with gestures, tone of voice, etc.
distinguishes meaning what you say from not meaning it.
But sometimes what distinguishes these two is nothing that happens
while we speak, but a variety of actions and experiences of different
kinds before and after.